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Abstract 
There are a multitude of threats now faced in computer networks such as viruses, 
worms, trojans, attempted user privilege gain, data stealing and denial of service. As a 
first line of defence, firewalls can be used to prevent threats from breaching a 
network. Although effective, threats can inevitably find loopholes to overcome a 
firewall. As a second line of defence, security systems, such as malicious software 
scanners may be put in place to detect a threat inside the network. However, such 
security systems cannot necessary detect all known threats, therefore a last line of 
defence comes in the form of logging a threat using Intrusion Detection Systems 
(Buchanan, 2009, p. 43).  
Being the last line of defence, it is vital that IDSs are up to an efficient standard in 
detecting threats. Researchers have proposed methodologies for the evaluation of 
IDSs but, currently, no widely agreed upon standard exists (Mell, Hu, Lippmann, 
Haines, & Zissman, 2003, p. 1). Many different categories of IDSs are available, 
including host-based IDS (HIDS), network-based IDS (NIDS) and distributed-based 
IDS (DIDS). Attempting to evaluate these different categories of IDSs using a 
standard accepted methodology allows for accurate benchmarking of results. This 
thesis reviews four existing methodologies and concludes that the most important 
aspects in an effective evaluation of IDSs must include realistic attack and 
background traffic, ease of automation and meaningful metrics of evaluation.  
A prototype framework is proposed which is capable of generating realistic attacks 
including surveillance/probing, user privilege gain, malicious software and denial of 
service. The framework also has the capability of background traffic generation using 
static network data sets. The detection metrics of efficiency, effectiveness and packet 
loss are defined along with resource utilisation metrics in the form of CPU utilisation 
and memory usage. A GUI developed in Microsoft .NET C# achieves automation of 
sending attack and background traffic, along with the generation of detection metrics 
from the data logged by the IDS under evaluation. 
Using a virtual networking environment, the framework is evaluated against the NIDS 
Snort to show the capabilities of the implementation. Mono was used to run the .NET 
application in a Linux environment. The results showed that, whilst the NIDS is 
highly effective in the detection of attacks (true-positives), its main weakness is the 
dropping of network packets at higher CPU utilisations due to high traffic volume. At 
around 80Mbps playback volumes of background traffic and above, it was found that 
Snort would begin to drop packets. Furthermore, it was also found that the NIDS is 
not very efficient as it tends to raise a lot of alerts even when there are no attacks 
(false-positives).  
The conclusion drawn in this thesis is that the framework is capable of carrying out an 
evaluation of an NIDS. However, several limitations to the current framework are also 
identified. One of the key limitations is that there is a need for controlled aggregation 
of network traffic in this framework so that attack and background traffic can be more 
realistically mixed together. Furthermore, the thesis shows that more research is 
required in the area of background traffic generation. Although the framework is 
capable of generating traffic using state data sets, a more ideal solution would be an 
implementation in which allows the user to select certain “profiles” of network traffic. 
This would serve the purpose of better reflecting the network environment in which 
the IDS will be deployed on. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Project Overview 
It is stated in the work of Mell, Hu, Lippmann, Haines, & Zissman (2003) that “while 
intrusion detection systems are becoming ubiquitous defences in today’s networks, 
currently we have no comprehensive and scientifically rigours methodologies to test 
the effectiveness of these systems (Mell, et al., 2003, p. 1).” In other words, a 
standard accepted methodology is still a requirement in the evaluation of IDSs.  
The aim of this project is to produce a prototype framework which is capable of 
carrying out an evaluation of an NIDS. The design of the framework is achieved by 
attempting to apply the strengths of existing methodologies proposed by researchers 
whilst avoiding the limitations as best as possible. The use of meaningful metrics of 
evaluation for this framework are also been taken into consideration. The 
implementation is carried out using Microsoft .NET C# and ran under a Linux 
environment. The framework is then used to evaluate the NIDS Snort in order to 
establish the effectiveness of the approach taken. 
 
1.2 Background 
Burglar alarms, smoke alarms, fire alarms and closed circuit television all fall under 
the category of real life, physical intrusion detection systems (Del Carlo, Lakes, 
Illinois, & Practical, 2003, p.4). The purpose of these devices is to monitor specific 
threats, and, if the threat occurs, then either produce some form of alert (such as 
emitting a high pitched noise in the case of fire and burglar alarms) or log the activity 
(in the case of closed circuit television cameras). Examples of threats include fires and 
trespassing of property.  Consequences of these threats being acted out may result in 
theft, damage to property or even worst scenarios. Therefore, it can be clear that such 
monitoring devices are highly important in functioning correctly, and perform the task 
they are intended to with absolute efficiency. In other words, such devices must 
perform to a certain standard. 
In order to ensure this standard is met, various organisations set up rules and 
guidelines which specify exactly how such devices must perform. One example is the 
National Fire Protection Association, which sets out guidelines for fire and smoke 
alarms testing. As quoted from Richardson and Moore, the guideline “covers the 
application, installation, location, performance, and maintenance of fire alarm systems 
and their components (Richardson & Moore, 2000, p. 20).” In other words, this 
standard covers the exact testing procedures which must be carried out against an 
alarm system and defines the exact metrics which make the device acceptable for use. 
With the increasingly rapid evolution of technology, it has been a lot easier for 
businesses and organisations to take advantage of local area networks for 
interconnecting their information systems together. With this growth, there has been 
increasing popularity in the usage and development of the internet as a whole 
(Howard, Paridaens, & Gramm, 2001, p. 117). Many computer threats have also 
appeared, therefore, a need for digital intrusion detection systems. To emphasise this 
point, the statistics provided in an independent survey of UK businesses conducted by 
the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills show that in the year 2008, there is 
05002961 SOC10101 
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still a relatively high number of malicious software and hacking attempts affecting 
information systems (Figure 1.2.1). 
 
Figure 1.2.1 – Security Breaches in UK Businesses (BIS, 2006), (BIS, 2008) 
Although, overall, the survey shows that breaches have been dropping each year, 
there is still a significant risk of computer threats at this point in time. To elaborate, a 
much more recent example of a security breach is a case which occurred in November 
of 2009 when criminals stole over £600,000 from bank accounts by simply installing 
a Trojan on host computers (Goodin, 2009, para. 1). Many more similar cases and 
examples of such breaches in information security can easily be found by simply 
monitoring the news on a daily basis. 
Since information security threats have just as serious consequences as fires or 
trespassing would one may conclude that there is a definite need for digital IDSs to 
monitor and detect such threats if they occur.  The issue at this point in time is that 
there is no standard method which can be used to assess the effectiveness of these 
programs (Mell et al., 2003, p.1). In comparison with the standards applied to testing, 
for example, a fire alarm, the methodology in evaluating a digital IDS is sorely 
lacking. Thus, it can be seen that it is highly important that exact methodology for 
testing and evaluating digital IDSs, one in which sets the standard of evaluation, is an 
absolute necessity.  
It should be noted that different categories of digital IDSs exist. This includes Host-
Based, Network-Based and Distributed-Based (see Section 2.3.3). The main scope 
and main focal point of this project will be on Network-Based IDSs (NIDS) though 
the other categories will be touched upon as well. 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this project is to produce a prototype framework which is capable 
of carrying out an evaluation of a NIDS. In order to meet this aim, the following three 
main objectives must be met:  
05002961 SOC10101 
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1. Review and research the taxonomy of IDSs and existing methodologies for 
evaluation including the testing methods applied along with metrics of 
evaluation. 
 
2. Design a framework which can be used to evaluate a NIDS based on the 
findings of the literature review with justification for design choices made. 
 
3. Implement and evaluate the framework by testing it against an NIDS to see 
what results are produced in order to assess the capabilities of the 
framework. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure  
This thesis is split into six main chapters. They are described as follows: 
 Chapter 1 – Introduction: Provides the project overview and background to 
the subject of Intrusion Detection Systems. The key aim and objectives of the 
project are also defined along with the thesis structure.  
 
 Chapter 2 – Literature Review: An introduction to information security is 
first provided along with a research on the taxonomy of IDSs. The main focal 
point of the chapter, an analysis of the existing methodologies used in the 
evaluation of IDSs is then reviewed with emphasis on analysing the strengths 
and weaknesses of the method. Finally, a conclusion is reached which 
provides the driving force behind this project.  
 
 Chapter 3 – Design: Based on the conclusion reached in the literature review, 
this chapter proposes a design of a prototype framework which is required for 
carrying out an evaluation of an NIDS with justifications as to why the 
approach is viable.  
 
 Chapter 4 – Implementation: This chapter documents the steps taken in 
creating the framework based on the design from the previous chapter. 
Snippets of code along with screenshots are provided to show the many 
functions of the implementation.  
 
 Chapter 5 – Evaluation:  An evaluation of the prototype framework is 
provided in this chapter. Using the framework, an experiment, in the form of a 
set of tests, is carried out against the NIDS known as Snort. The experiment is 
described along with results produced. An analysis of results is also provided. 
 
 Chapter 6 – Conclusion: A conclusion to how well this project met the initial 
aim and objectives originally set out is provided. A self-reflection section is 
also provided to discuss some of the difficulties faced and how they were 
overcome along with a discussion on project management. Finally, this 
chapter ends with a section dedicated to describing some directions in which 
future work can be taken in this subject area. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review first provides a background to information security (Section 
2.2). To understand the basic concepts of IDSs a review of the taxonomy and 
characteristics (Section 2.3) of this topic is then carried out. Some of the main 
network security threats are then analysed (Section 2.4) in order to understand what 
an IDS should be capable of detecting.  
The main focal point of the review, methodologies in the evaluation of IDSs, is then 
provided (Section 2.5) along with looking at existing programs and tools which allow 
for testing of IDSs (Section 2.6). Finally, a conclusion (Section 2.7) is drawn which, 
based on the methodologies reviewed, identifies three main requirements for an 
effective evaluation of IDSs. 
2.2 Information Security 
A clear and concise definition of “security” may be found by Whitman and Mattord 
(2008), in which they state that it is a form of “protection against adversaries – from 
those who would do harm, intentionally or otherwise (Whitmand & Mattord, 2008, 
p.8)”. In other words, security is safeguarding against both intentional and 
unintentional threats. To simplify this even further, we can consider security as a form 
of protection from danger. Security can be applied to many different areas (such as 
physical security as an example) but, for the scope of this thesis, the main focus will 
be on information security.  
Information security can be considered an all encompassing term and consist of the 
following components: management of information security, computer & data 
security, policies and network security (Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 8). In other 
words, information security is a combination of all four components and applying 
each area in practice. Perhaps the most important concept behind information security 
is the key principle of CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability). This key 
principle is described in the section which follows. 
2.2.1 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability  
In regards to information security, it is widely accepted that a threat to information 
systems will generally affect one or more of either: confidentiality, integrity or 
availability of a resource (Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 8).  Thus, the purpose and 
goal in information security is to protect these three key principles. The “resource” 
itself can be anything which is deemed important, whether it is a physical entity (such 
as paper documents or computer hardware) or a virtual entity (such as a computer 
database or source code to a piece of software). Confidentiality is making sure 
information is accessible to authorised persons only; integrity is ensuring data is 
correct and accurate whilst availability refers to having access to information systems 
when required (Cavalli, Mattasoglio, Pinciroli & Spaggiari, 2004, p. 298).  
To elaborate further, Table 2.2.1 is shown in which gives examples of a threat being 
against a resource and the principle in which would be compromised. The table 
provided gives example of three threats. Each of them will compromise one of the 
principles in information security. Such threats may be grouped into different 
categories and it is the intention of the next section to look into the different types of 
threats faced in information security. 
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Table 2.2.1 – Example of Threats against C.I.A 
Resource Threat Compromises 
Classified medical record of 
a patient. 
Gaining unauthorized access to this record and 
reading or distributing the information to 
others. 
Confidentiality 
Database which contains 
detail of a Bank’s customer. 
Breaking into the database, and changing the 
data of customer details. 
Integrity 
A Server hosting a website. Using computer security exploits to bring the 
system down. 
Availability 
2.2.2 Categories of Threats in Information Security 
Attempting to provide an exhaustive list of all threats faced by information systems 
would be both very time consuming and, perhaps, even impossible due to the sheer 
volume that exist (NIST, 2006, p. 21). Ultimately the threats faced by users or 
organisations may differ dependant on the environment where the information 
systems are contained.   
However, at the same time, it is important to establish what some of the main threats 
of this subject is. Therefore, the following paragraphs provide categories of well 
known threats which are derived from the work of Whitman and Mattord (2008). 
Additional references have been cited for clarification on some of the threats shown: 
 Human Error: Involves accidents and mistakes which are made by users of 
information systems. This may be due to lack of training or inexperience when 
using information systems (Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 42). In some cases 
this threat may involve a user being tricked by social engineering - which 
involves exploiting someone through manipulation of their behaviour 
(Workman, 2007, p. 316) in order to get them to release confidential 
information such as their password to computer systems. 
 
 Trespassing: Involves both intentional and unintentional access to 
unauthorized data and information. Although such an act may have been 
unintentional, the result is still a loss of confidentiality in information 
(Whitman and Mattord, 2008, p. 45). Furthermore, if the act is intentional 
there is the possibility of it being industrial espionage which is when 
information is gathered from one company and given to a competing company 
in order to give them an advantage (NIST, 2006, p. 26). This threat may also 
be physical, in that a person walking into an unauthorized area would be an 
example of trespassing. 
 
 Theft: Includes both the physical theft of computer systems and equipments 
along with the theft of data in the form of information.  
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 Sabotage: Forms of sabotage may come from employees who damage or 
misuse computer equipment (Corsini, 2008, p.8) as well as more serious cases 
where company websites are vandalised which results in a loss of reputation 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 52). The reason behind such sabotage may 
include disgruntled employees or simply mischievous acts which were carried 
out in boredom. 
 
 Software Attacks: Includes all forms of malicious software such as worms, 
viruses and trojan horses.  In most cases, systems infected with such software 
will result in decreased productively from users due to the time and cost 
required to clean the infected system (NIST, 2006, p. 27). Furthermore, brute 
force attacks - which involve software which tries to guess the password to a 
username by attempting all possibilities (Cornsini, 2006, p. 8) - and denial of 
service attacks - which attempt to starve the system under attack from all 
resources (Ptacek, Newsham & Simpson, 1998, p. 10) which result in a crash - 
also fall under this category. 
 
 Technical Hardware Failure: Hardware which contains flaws due to design 
errors or lack of maintenance over time may suffer instabilities or even 
complete failure. One example of a hardware design flaw is from the Intel 
Pentium II CPU which contained a floating point bug which resulted in 
calculation errors (Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 62) requiring a total recall of 
the product hence a great loss in money.  
 
 Technical Software Failure: Programming flaws and errors overlooked during 
the design and implementation of software results in vulnerabilities being 
exploited or bugs in a programme (NIST, 2006, p. 22). The same may apply if 
software is not updated over time. 
 
 Forces of Nature: Natural disasters such as fires, floods, earth quakes and 
lightning all pose a threat to information systems.  Results from such disasters 
may include the worst case scenario of systems being damaged beyond all 
repairs. The unpredictability of natural disasters means it can be difficult to 
safeguard against such threats (Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 59). 
 
Threats such as human error may be reduced through training of users involved in 
information systems. The chances of technical hardware and software failing is also 
reduced if proper maintenance and upgrade to components and resources as carried 
out. However, at the same time, even by applying every safe guard possible, there is 
always a small risk of a threat being carried out due to unknown vulnerabilities. This 
is especially true in the case of such threats as software attacks and information theft 
since no physical evidence may be left behind after the threat occurs therefore users 
may be completely unaware an attack took place. The point to be made here is that 
threats cannot always be prevented but, they can be detected, stopped as soon as 
possible and safeguarded against in the future. 
As the first chapter of this thesis has already described, physical detection systems 
such as fire alarms or C.C.T.V’s allow for the detection of specific real-life threats 
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such as fires or trespassers but, there is no possibility in these devices detecting a 
denial of service attack, a rogue virus spreading itself throughout a computer network 
or an application suddenly modifying user passwords. Thus, this lead on to the need 
for mechanism for the detection of non-physical information system threats which 
may be achieved by deploying digital IDSs. The next section of this report will focus 
on the taxonomy of this subject. 
 
2.3 Intrusion Detection System Taxonomy 
The meaning of taxonomy is in providing a unique label for each entity within a 
subject area. The purpose of which is to allow researchers to easily communicate and 
group subjects matters together. To elaborate, the work of Almgren, Lundin & 
Jonsson (2003) state that having a good taxonomy allows other people to express their 
thoughts and ideas in a manner which is universally understood by all others working 
on the same research area (Almgren et al., 2003, p. 57). 
Unfortunately, a singular and widely agreed upon taxonomy of IDSs does not exist 
(Tucker, Furnell, Ghita & Brooke, 2007, p. 88-89). This is due, partly, to the fact that 
as you delve deeper into the technical aspects of IDS, it becomes more difficult and 
complicated to classify specific elements into a standard category due to ambiguity or 
technical complexity. 
The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive taxonomy into IDSs – 
such an objective is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, the focus will be in 
providing a taxonomy on concepts, terms, and ideas which is widely accepted by 
researchers.  Although the introduction to this thesis has briefly described the general 
purpose of an IDS, this section intends to delve a lot deeper into this subject area. 
2.3.1 Definition and Purpose of Intrusion Detection Systems 
A standard definition of the term intrusion is described as “the act of intruding or the 
state of being intruded; especially: the act of wrongfully entering upon, seizing, or 
taking possession of the property of another (Webster-Merriam, 2009).” From this 
definition, one may conclude that an intrusion is to enter upon a domain which is 
considered restricted, regardless of whether the act is considered intentional or not.  
In other words, if we apply the term intrusion to the topic of information security, this 
can be considered simply as another form of a threat being acted out (an attack). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that an intrusion in this context will threaten to 
compromise one or more of the three principles of information security: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (previous discussed in Section 2.2.1). This 
idea is backed up in the work of Purcell (2007), in which the author states that IDSs 
are a control measure (Purcell, 2007, para. 6) whilst the work by NIST (2006) 
reinforces this by stating that the purpose of IDSs is in “identifying attempts to 
penetrate a system and gain unauthorized access (NIST, 1996, p. 215).” To describe it 
in another way, an IDS can be defined as a control measure of which the purpose is to 
detect threats which put information systems at risk. 
It is also important to note what is not considered the purpose of an IDS. From the 
work of Kazienko and Dorosz (2003), they state that security devices such as network 
logging systems, anti-virus detection/protection, vulnerability assessment tools, 
firewalls and security/cryptographic systems, although similar to the purpose of IDSs, 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  17 
should not be classified under the same category as IDSs (Kazienko & Dorosz, 2003, 
para. 3). Such security devices will most likely work together in order to provide for 
multiple layers of defence in information security, but the general functionality of 
these devices will differ from an IDS. 
To provide a summary to this section, the most important point that should be 
understood is the fact that all threats, from an Information Security stand point, will 
compromise one or more of the three key principle areas which are, to repeat: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. The purpose of IDSs is in detecting threats 
which compromise any of these three principles. Devices such as firewalls and 
network logging systems may achieve the same goals, but their functionalities will 
differ to that of an IDS. 
2.3.2 IDS Framework and Characteristics  
Many different types of IDSs currently exist, and, as expected, they will function 
differently dependant on the design choices taken in implementation. It can be helpful 
for users wishing to learn about this subject if a common model exists which acts as a 
form of blueprint which relates to all IDSs. The work produced by Porras, 
Schnackenberg, Staniford-Chen, Stillman and Wu (1998) recognised this importance, 
and the result of the authors work is the Common Intrusion Detection Framework 
(CIDF).  
In the CIDF, the IDSs are divided into four main components, which are as follows: 
event generators (known as “E-boxes”), event analyzers (“A-boxes”), event databases 
(“D-boxes”) and response units (“R-boxes”) (Porras et al., 1998, para. 21-26). Table 
2.3.1 provides a summary as to what the purposes of each of these components are. 
Table 2.3.1 – Description of the four components of the CIDF 
Component Name Purpose of Component 
Event Generators (E-Boxes) The E-Box is the sensor, which will monitor and 
obtain activity (such as network traffic) and 
convert the data it sees into the CIDF format so 
the other components can interpret it. 
Event Analysers (A-Boxes) The A-Box receives data from the E-box and will 
analyse it. Method of analysis is dependent on the 
design of the IDS. 
Event Databases (D-Boxes) The D-Box is simply where the analysed data is 
stored. 
Response Units (R-Boxes) Based on the analysed data, and, once again, on 
the design of the IDS, a response will be carried 
out which may include producing an alert (if the 
data analysed is considered an intrusion) or the 
event is simply logged. 
 
 
To provide for a better visual representation of how these components interact with 
each other, Figure 2.3.1 is presented which comes from the work produced by Ptacek, 
et al. (1998). It should be made clear that although the diagram labels one of the 
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components as a “Countermeasure (C) Box”, this serves the exact same function as 
the Response Units (R-Box) described in the previous table.  
 
Figure 2.3.1 - CIDF interaction method (Ptacek et al., 1998) 
From the description and the figure provided, it can be seen that each component 
relies upon each other, both directly and indirectly. What can be summarised is that 
although different IDSs will carry out the task of intrusion detection using their own 
methods, all IDSs will still be similar due to the fact that they are based on the design 
of this framework. 
However, criticism has been made against the CIDF. One in particular was made in 
the technical report produced by the Malicious and Accidental Fault Tolerance for 
Internet Applications (MAFTIA) project. In this technical report, Powell  and Stroud 
(2001) state that the Response Units (R-Boxes) should not be considered a part of the 
IDS but rather a separate entity due to the fact that, by definition, the purpose of a IDS 
is in detecting intrusion, not responding to it (Powell & Stroud, 2001, p. 28). 
Following on from this statement, the authors have attempted to provide their own 
refinement to the CIDF which can be seen in Figure 2.3.2. This may be considered a 
minor piece of criticism though, since both Porras et al. (1998) and Powell & Stroud 
(2001) appear to agree that the response units, regardless of whether or not it is part of 
the CIDF, is still a requirement since some form of action must take place if a attack 
is detected.  
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Figure 2.3.2 - Refined CIDF Model (Powell & Stroud, 2001) 
Having looked at the basic IDS framework, a review of the main characteristics of an 
IDS will be carried out. In the work produced by Debar, Dacier & Wespi (1999), the 
authors defines IDSs as having four main characteristics: Detection Method, 
Behaviour on Detection, Audit Source Location and Usage Frequency (Figure 2.3.3).  
What can be made clear is that each of the three functional characteristics provided in 
the figure can be easily linked to one of the components of the CIDF described earlier. 
In regards to the three functional characteristics: audit source location refers to how 
the IDS goes about obtaining activity and converting it to data the system can 
understand (E-Box), the detection method will analyse this data for attacks (A-Box) 
and behaviour on detection defines what action will be taken whether or not attacks 
are found (R-Box) (Debar et al., 1999, p. 8 - 9).   
The usage frequency refers to whether the IDS runs continuously or periodically and 
since it is a non-functional characteristic no relation can be made with the CIDF. 
However, to provide for a brief description, continuous monitoring simply refers to an 
IDS which will monitor for threats without interruption whilst periodic analysis 
means the IDS monitors for threats on at certain intervals. 
The audit source location, including host, network and distributed based, is described 
in greater detail in Section 2.3.3 whilst information on detection methods, which can 
be either behaviour or knowledge based, is found in Section 2.3.4. 
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Figure 2.3.3 - Characteristics of an IDS (Debar et al., 1999)  
 
2.3.3 Host-Based, Network-Based and Distributed-Based IDS 
The work by Debar et al. (1999) states that there are three main categories of audit 
source locations implemented in IDSs including host-based IDS (HIDS), network-
based IDS (NIDS) (Corsini, 2009, p. 15) and distributed-based IDS (DIDS) described 
by Snapp, Brentano, Dias, Goan, Heberlein, Ho, Levitt, Mukherjee, Smaha, Grance, 
Teal, & Mansur (1991). 
In HIDSs, the internal activities of the computer system in which it resides is 
monitored and analysed through the usage of audit data which is provided by the 
operating system (Vigna, Robertson & Balzarotti, 2004, p. 21). For example, an HIDS 
may monitor the memory usage of programs and produce an alert if the resources 
taken up by the program begin to fluctuate in an unexpected manner.  Figure 2.3.4 
shows an example of the location of various HIDSs residing in some of the 
workstations and one of the servers on a network. 
In comparison, NIDSs involve looking at both incoming and outgoing network 
packets and attempt to find any acts of attacks (Debar et al., 1999, p. 817). In other 
words, an NIDSs main task is in the analysis of traffic on a network. For a NIDS to 
work, it must be either connected to a span port on a switch or a device such as a 
router (Beale, Baker & Esler, 2007, p. 5) in order to capture all traffic on a network. 
Furthermore, a network interface card (NIC) is obviously needed. Figure 2.3.5 shows 
an example of one single NIDS connected to the switch of a network. The location of 
the NIDS allows it to monitor all network traffic activity on this network.  
In a DIDS, the techniques of both HIDS and NIDS are used, thus this can be 
considered a hybrid form of IDS (Debar et al., 1999, p. 817). DIDS functions by using 
multiple IDSs which monitor both the hosts connected to a network, along with the 
network activity itself and reports all information captured to a centralized IDS, 
known as the DIDS director (Snapp et al., 1991, p. 168). Figure 2.3.6 shows an 
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example of the usage of a DIDS on a network. It should be noted that in DIDSs, there 
is the possibility of an IDS being both a HIDS and NIDS at the same time (Beale et 
al., 2007, p. 8) which is not shown in the figure. The main point to be made is that all 




Figure 2.3.4 – Example of HIDSs on a Network 
 
 
Figure 2.3.5 – Example of an NIDS on a Network 
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Figure 2.3.6 – Example of DIDSs on a Network 
What may be concluded is that there are three main types of IDSs: HIDS, NIDS and 
DIDS.  The use of the term “IDS” is used to describe intrusion detection systems 
generically, whilst if one was to describe a topic in regards to a specific category of 
IDS, the acronyms HIDS, NIDS or DIDS will be used instead. 
2.3.4 Detection Methods 
The work of Debar et al. (1999) states that there two main forms of detection 
methods: behaviour based and knowledge based. These are more commonly known as 
anomaly detection and misuse detection methods. The purpose of both methods is in 
attempting to detect any attacks or intrusions on a system.  The main characteristic of 
anomaly detection is in looking for any unexpected changes in behaviour of a system 
against what is considered “normal” behaviour whilst misuse detection involves 
comparing incoming threats against a predefined knowledge base in order to decide 
whether the threat is considered an attack or intrusion (Debar et al., 1999, p. 810).   
As mentioned in the above paragraph, an anomaly detection method works by 
comparing normal behaviour against the current pattern of behaviour in a system.  In 
order to achieve this task, the main challenge in anomaly detection methods is in 
learning what is considered “normal” behaviour. The work by Axelsson (2000) 
describes the two main approaches which are used to achieve this goal: self-learning 
or programmed anomaly detection. In the self-learning approach, the anomaly 
detection system will begin to automatically monitor events, such as live network 
traffic, on the environment it has been implemented on and attempt to build 
information on what is considered normal behaviour (Axelsson, 2000, p. 5). This is 
otherwise known as online learning (Gong, 2003, p. 3). In the programmed approach, 
the anomaly system must manually learn what is considered normal behaviour by 
having a user or some form of function “teaching” the system through input of 
information (Axelsson, 2000, p. 5). This is otherwise known as offline learning, and 
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may involve feeding the system a network traffic data set which contains normal 
network traffic (Gong, 2003, p. 3). One of the most common methods for building the 
behaviour information in both self-learning and programmed anomaly detection 
systems is through statistical analysis. This involves measuring the average time it 
takes for a task to be carried out, such as the average time taken for a user to invoke a 
login to a server, and storing this information as variables (Debar et al., 1999, p. 813).  
These variables are then used in comparison against the activities when the anomaly 
system is deployed.  
Misuse detection methods, in comparison, require that all known threats will be 
defined first, and the information regarding these threats to be submitted to the NIDS. 
Thus, the NIDS is able to then compare all incoming, or outgoing, activity against all 
known threats in its knowledge base and raise an alarm if any activity matches 
information in the knowledge base. The information stored in this knowledge base is 
usually known as signatures. Misuse detection methods normally requires a user to 
manually define all signatures it should detect, therefore only a programmed approach 
can be used for this detection method (Axelsson, 2000, p. 6).  The process for actually 
matching a signature with an attack include simple string matching – which involves 
looking for unique key words in network traffic to indentify attacks – to more 
complex approaches such as rule-based matching which defines the behaviour of an 
attack as a signature (Axellson, 2000, p. 7). 
Both anomaly and misuse detection methods have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. In terms of misuse detection, this method is very reliable in detecting 
attacks so long as the signature has been properly defined in the knowledge base. 
Furthermore, since the signature must be predefined, if an alarm is triggered, then we 
can easily determine what type of attack was actually detected by the system. The 
obvious disadvantage here is that any attack which does not have a predefined 
signature will never be detected (Zhengbing, Zhitang and Junqi, 2008, p. 2). The 
opposite is true of anomaly detection methods in which new or unknown attacks can 
be detected since this approach is based on behaviour rather than predefined 
signatures however, the main disadvantage is that the system may not provide in-
depth details such as the type of attack which raised the alarm and whether or not it 
was an actual valid attack (Deri, Suin and Maselli, 2003, p. 2).  
Finally, as mentioned earlier in this section, when an IDS - using either the anomaly 
or misuse method - detects an attack, an alarm will be raised. As described by the 
author Beale et al. (2007), the main four types of alarm consist of: true positive, false 
positive and false negative (Beale et al., 2007, p. 13).  A short summary of each alarm 
is described as follows: 
 True Positive refers to when an attack has been detected and alerted properly. 
 False Negative refers to when an attack takes place but no alarm has been 
raised. 
 False positive refers to when an alarm is raised but no attack has taken place. 
 True Negative which refers to when no attack takes place and no alarm is 
raised. 
 
2.4 Network Security Threats 
Since the focal point of this thesis is on NIDSs, some network threats will be looked 
at in this section. Similar to Section 2.2.2, attempting to compile a comprehensive list 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  24 
of threats is an extremely difficult task, therefore, only the most common and well 
known network security threats have been included. Theoretically, an IDS should be 
capable of detecting all threats which are described here. 
2.4.1 Surveillance/Probing 
The purpose of surveillance/probing is to gather information on a network (Wagh, 
2009, para. 1) such as topology, IP addresses of machines and open network ports. 
Although surveillance or probing carried out on a network is not considered harmful 
by itself, it is usually a clear indicator that an attack may result in the future 
(Buchanan, 2009, p. 50). 
Network surveillance and probing can be carried out with many types of utilities and 
programs but, perhaps the most popular one used today is known as Nmap (Lyon, 
2009). Surveillance and probing carried out on Nmap is usually known as a sweep or 
a scan, and many types exist, including: port scan, port sweep and ping sweep. Port 
scan, as the name will suggest, is in scanning a network host in order to look for any 
open ports whilst port sweep involves scanning multiple hosts within a network with 
the same objective in mind. Pingsweeps will attempt to “ping” each host on a network 
to see whether it is up. 
2.4.2 User Privilege Gain 
A user privilege gain attack consists of attempts to obtain access to a users account on 
a system. This usually involves the guessing of user name and passwords using 
techniques such as brute force dictionary attacks or, in some cases, more sophisticated 
methods such as social engineering (Workman, 2007, p. 316) may be used instead to 
trick a user into giving out their password. 
An example of a program which can carry such attacks is Hydra (THC, 2009) which 
is capable of carrying out dictionary attacks (Corsini, 2009, p. 20) on protocols 
including Telnet, FTP, SSH and HTTP. In dictionary attacks, a user name and 
password list is supplied to the program along with the target. This program will then 
attempt to try all combinations of passwords and return a result if one is successful. 
Also, related to this threat is user root gains. Once an attacker has managed to gain a 
user account via tools such as Hydra, attempts may then be made to gain higher levels 
of access such as the administration or root account (Buchannan, 2008, p. 28). Such 
an attack being successful could be very dangerous. By having access to the highest 
level account, an attacker could inevitably have control over an entire system. In other 
words, the attacker would be free to do as he pleased such as deleting critical system 
files, browse confidential files or change the password on other user accounts.  
 
2.4.3 Viruses, Worms and Trojans 
Viruses, worms and trojans are all considered malicious software. In the work of 
NIST (2006, p. 27) the following summary of each of the three types of malicious 
software are described: 
 Viruses are a piece of code which attaches itself to an application (such as an 
.exe file) and is executed when the application is run by the user. Viruses may 
carry out malicious actions such as overwriting or deleting system files. 
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 Worms differ from viruses in that it does not require to be attached to an 
application. Instead, it will exist independently and attempt to replicate itself 
and propagate throughout a network. 
 
 Trojan horses are disguised as legitimate software, and when executed, will 
open up a “backdoor” (such as opening up a port) which allows access to that 
machine from outsiders of the network. 
 
2.4.4 Denial of Service Attacks 
The main purpose of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is in using up all available 
resources such as CPU and memory (Ptacek et al., 1998, p. 39) on either the target 
system or even the NIDS which monitors traffic on the target network. This may 
result in the target system crashing, or simply not responding as expected. In the case 
of carrying out a DoS attack on an IDS there is the possibility of the system letting 
additional attacks slip past undetected as it attempts to recover. One of such program 
which will allow for carrying out of DoS attacks is known as Hping3 (Hping3, 2009). 
Various methods may be used in order to carry out a DoS attack. The three main types 
of attacks consist of TCP floods, ICMP floods and UDP floods (Houle, Weaver, Long 
& Thomas, 2001, p. 3). An example of a TCP flood involves sending huge numbers 
of request packets (SYN) to a server in order to starve it of all resources, whilst ICMP 
may involve simply sending large numbers of pings (echo request packets) to a server 
so that it consumes all its resources in attempting to reply. UDP floods function 
similar to TCP floods. It is not always necessary for the attacker to send a flood of 
traffic to the victim. One such example is the LAND attack, in which a single packet 
is crafted that connects a victim’s network socket to itself.  Over time, this can cause a 
system to lockup.  
A variation of a DoS attack, known as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
exists. In DDoS the use of multiple computers to send out requests to a single receiver 
is carried out (Kargl, Maier & Weber, 2001, p. 516). DDoS attacks are usually 
controlled by one main machine known as the Master program and, when initiated, it 
will communicate with all other machines which have a “bot” installed on them to 
initiate an attack on a single target. 
 
2.5 Methodologies in Evaluating IDSs 
Many evaluation methodologies have been proposed by researchers over the past few 
years. The main purpose of this section is in analysing some of the methods used and 
attempt to gain some perspective on what may be considered an effective 
methodology. To achieve this goal, the first concept which is reviewed is the two 
main techniques used in carrying out an evaluation: black-box and white-box testing. 
2.5.1 Black-Box and White-Box Testing 
Two main techniques may be applied when carrying testing in general: black-box 
testing and white-box testing. Table 2.2.1 provides a definition of black-box and 
white-box testing which is summarised from the work of Sharma, Kumar, and Grover 
(2007).  
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Table 2.5.1 – Definition of Black-Box and White-Box Testing (Sharma et al., 2007) 
Testing Technique Definition 
Black-Box Testing is applied to an entity where the 
internal workings are unknown. 
White-Box Testing is applied to an entity where the 
internal workings are known and are 
changeable. 
 
Although the two testing methods are more commonly seen in software engineering 
we may still apply such techniques to evaluating IDSs. For example, in the work of 
Gadelrab and El Kalam Abou (2006), the author states that there are two main 
methods in evaluating IDSs, both of which follow either the principles of black-box 
testing or white-box testing. The authors refer to the principles as evaluation by test 
(black-box testing) and analytic evaluation (white-box testing) (Gadelrab & El Kalam 
Abou, 2006, p. 271).   
An example of analytical evaluation is given in the work of Alessandri (2004). The 
basis of this approach is in predicting whether or not the design of the IDS will be 
able to detect specific attacks (Alessandri, 2004, p. 13). In order to do this, the author 
attempts to group attack types into classifications and provide a description to the 
system on how each class of attack will behave. By comparing the IDSs design 
against certain classes of attack, they propose that their method should predict 
whether or not the attack will be effective. This is considered white-box testing due to 
the fact that the inner-workings of the IDS must be known in order to carry out the 
evaluation effectively (Gadelrab & El Kalam Abou, 2006, p. 271). Although this is a 
viable approach, it is more suited to testing IDSs under development since the inner 
workings of the IDS must be known before such evaluation may take place 
(Alessandri, 2004, p. 44).  
The other method, evaluation by testing, can be considered a black-box testing 
technique. The general principle behind this method is that the IDS will be tested 
against various attacks, preferably in conjunction with background traffic (Gadelrab 
& El Kalam Abou, 2006, p. 271).  After testing is completed, the IDS will be 
evaluated against certain metrics which are defined by the designer of the test. This is 
considered a black-box testing technique due to the fact that during the evaluation 
process, we generally don’t care how the IDS will handle the attack, but whether or 
not it detects the attack, and how efficiently it does so in regards to the metrics 
defined.  
It can be summarised that evaluation by testing (black-box testing) provides for a 
much more solid basis in terms of evaluation results, since metrics must be defined 
and accounted for. In comparison, since the results from analytical evaluation are 
simply predictions, the accuracy of the evaluation may be a issue. At the same time, 
this does not mean analytic evaluation is irrelevant since this approach will provide 
for a far more solid design of an IDS which is still under development.   
Since evaluation by testing is more relevant to this literature review, the next few 
sections will look at some of the methods which various researchers have used in 
evaluating IDSs. Two main categories of evaluation by testing exist: online and 
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offline evaluation. The next section provides a brief summary and difference between 
these two forms of evaluation. 
2.5.2 Real-time and Offline Evaluation 
As described by Sommers, Yegneswaran and Barford (2005), offline evaluation 
consists of “the use of canonical packet traces for offline tests (Sommers et al., 2005, 
p. 1)”. In other words, the basic idea of offline evaluation is in recording network 
packets, otherwise known as data sets, and then playing the traces back against the 
IDS under evaluation. By comparison, online evaluation involves testing IDSs using 
live network traffic which may be generated using traffic load generator (Ranum, 
2001, p.6). To summarise, the difference between offline and online evaluation is as 
follows: 
 Offline evaluation involves playing back data sets to the IDS under evaluation. 
These data sets may be captured with packet sniffer programs and then played 
back with a tool such as Tcpreplay (Turner & Bing, 2009) which is capable of 
playing back network data sets at variable speeds.  
 
 Real-time evaluations does not provide the IDS with data sets, instead live 
traffic is used. Tools and software may still be used to generate the traffic but 
in this scenario it is live traffic which is being sent through a network rather 
than data sets which are being replayed. In other words, the network will 
“react” accordingly to the traffic which is sent. 
Both methods of evaluation will be covered in the following sections. For 
clarification, the DARPA (Section 2.5.3) and the Automated evaluation (Section 
2.5.4) are both forms of offline evaluation. Real-time evaluation consists of LARIAT 
(Section 2.5.5) and Trident (Section 2.5.6). 
2.5.3 DARPA Evaluation  
One of the first well known evaluations comes from MIT Lincoln Labs, sponsored by 
the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), known commonly as the 
DARPA evaluation. This work is described by Lippmann, Haines, Fried, Korba and 
Das (2000). The main goal in the DARPA evaluation was to carry out a non biased 
measurement on the performance of various anomaly-based IDSs along with 
producing an evaluation data set which could be used by others in testing their IDSs 
(McHugh, 2000, p. 267).  
 In order to carry out these objectives, Lincoln Lab set up a test network and, through 
the use of programs, to emulate a large number of workstations, and scripts, created 
synthetic background traffic mixed with attack traffic at certain periods of time 
(Brugger & Chow, 2007, p. 1). The traffic is then captured with a packet capture tool 
and saved as a data set. This data set could then be played back against the IDS under 
evaluation to access its performance. Both inside and outside traffic was captured for 
this experiment.  The term “inside” refers to network traffic which would be seen 
within a local area network (LAN), whilst “outside” would be any traffic outside of 
this LAN. A router is used in the experiments to separate the inside and outside 
traffic. Figure 2.5.1 has been presented to show the DARPA test bed which was used. 
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Figure 2.5.1 – DARPA Evaluation Test bed (Lippman et al., 2000) 
 
The data sets used in the DARPA experiment was released to the public in 1998 and 
is referred to as the Intrusion Detection Evaluation (IDEVAL) 1998 data set.  The 
1998 data set contains 7 weeks of training data, used to train the anomaly system, and 
two weeks of test data used to test the IDS for detection performance (Brugger & 
Chow, 2007, p. 2). In 1999, a second data set was produced by the same group, 
known as the IDEVAL 1999 data set, which contained improvements such as 
containing stealthier and a wider range of attacks (Brugger & Chow, 2007, p.2). The 
1999 data set was made up of two weeks of training data and three weeks of test data 
(Lippmann et al., 2000, p. 579). 
With the use of static data sets, repeatability in experiments is easily achieved and, 
furthermore, the data set is easy to obtain and free to download. Thus, it may seem 
that the DARPA method is very well suited for testing IDSs. Unfortunately, both the 
data sets, and the way in which the evaluation was carried out has faced a lot of 
criticism by researchers.  
In regards to the data set, the IP header attributes contained in the synthesized 
background traffic including source IP addresses, destination IP addresses, Time To 
Live value and TCP options all had a small fixed range (Mahoney, 2003, p.  237). 
Real live traffic, in comparison, will generally contain a vast number of different IP 
addresses and ranges in their attributes. Therefore, the issue here is that the 
background traffic in the DARPA evaluation may not be considered similar or 
realistic enough to the type of traffic normally faced by IDSs.  
Criticism has also been made against the attack traffic in the DARPA data sets. 
During the 1998 DARPA evaluation, four main types of attacks were carried out, 
which included:  User to root, Remote to Local User, Denial of Service and 
Probe/Surveillance whilst the total number of each attack being carried out is in each 
of these categories is 114, 34, 99 and 64 respectively (Lippmann et al., 2000, p. 585-
586). The flaw here, as stated by Singaraju, Teo and Zheng (2004) is that these attacks 
- 311 in total – were launched over approximately 9 weeks of testing (5 days per 
week), therefore the average number of attacks is around 5-6 a day (Singaraju et al., 
2004, p. 2). Thus, distribution of attacks may be considered spread too thin in 
comparison with real life scenarios.  The 1999 data set contains a similar problem, 
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with only 200 attacks over 5 weeks of testing (Lippman et al., 2000, p. 579) - this 
results in approximately 8 attacks per day. 
Finally, in the work of McHugh (2000), the author states that the presentation of the 
evaluation results may not be completely meaningful since only one form of metric is 
used to determine the performance of the IDS under test (McHugh, 2000, p. 291). 
This metric which was used is known as the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curve, which is basically a graphical plot of the number of true positives versus false 
positives (Ulvila and Gaffney, 2003, p. 453). The problem with using only this 
singular metric, as stated by McHugh (2000), is that although it shows whether a 
greater number of true positives or false positives are detected, the ROC curve gives 
no clear indication to why the IDS under test will behave in such a way (McHugh, 
2000, p. 291). 
What can be concluded about the DARPA evaluation is that both attack and 
background traffic lack realism in comparison with real-life network traffic along 
with the fact that the metric of evaluation used does not give clear indication to the 
way the IDS performed, regardless of whether it was good or bad. Finally, though it is 
not mentioned in any cited references, it should be noted that it was more than a 
decade since the DARPA evaluation, hence newer and more sophisticated attacks may 
now exist therefore, the validity of testing IDSs using the DARPA attack data sets 
may not be relevant anymore. 
2.5.4 Automated Evaluation   
Having seen some of the shortcomings of the DARPA evaluation, it is worth looking 
at a more recent offline evaluation of IDSs carried out by Massicotte, Gagnon, 
Labiche, Briand and Couture (2006). In their work, the author’s main focus was in 
providing a more up-to-date attack data set which, similar to the DARPA evaluation, 
would be made freely available to the public so that others may use it to carry out 
their own testing against IDSs. 
The work by Massicotte et al. (2006) consisted of two main elements in which they 
termed as the Virtual Network Infrastructure (VNI) and the Intrusion Detection 
System Evaluation Framework (IDSEF). The VNI uses scripts and emulation 
software to automatically set up a virtual network environment which is used to 
generate attack traffic against specified targets within the emulated network topology 
(Massicotte et al., 2006, p.  362).  The main purpose of the VNI is in generating 
attacks on a virtual network and recording the network traffic whilst this take place in 
order to save it as a data set to be used in evaluating IDSs. Having acquired a data set, 
this can then be provided to the IDSEF in order to test and evaluate the chosen IDS 
under test. The VNI uses a layered approach which consists of using programs such as 
Metasploit (Metasploit Project, 2009) for the generating exploits whilst manipulation 
of packets for evasion/insertion is carried out using tools such as fragroute (Figure 
2.5.2). Unfortunately, a complete taxonomy of all attacks carried out was not provided 
in this piece of work.  
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Figure 2.5.2 – Automated Evaluation Attack System (Massicotte et al., 2006) 
In order to clarify how this evaluation works, the steps involved in both the setup and 
execution of the VNI along with the steps involved in using the IDSEF will be 
described. Ten main steps (Figure 2.5.3) are carried out in the automated evaluation.  
Steps one to five are summarised from (Massicotte et al., 2006, p. 363) whilst steps 
six to ten are summarised from (Massicotte et al., 2006, p. 365) and are as follows: 
1. Script Generation - Using what the author’s define as the Vulnerability 
Exploitation Program (VEP), script generation involves the user defining the 
types of attacks which should be ran along with specifying the target systems 
in the virtual network. 
 
2. Virtual Network Setup - This step will setup the virtual network dependant on 
the types of attacks and targets which were specified. For example, if the 
attack specified was on a web server, then the virtual network that is being 
setup would reflect this scenario. 
 
3. Current Attack Script Setup - Involves configuring the attacks that have been 
chosen to be executed. 
 
4. Attack Execution - Involves running the specified attack(s) against the chosen 
target(s). 
 
5. Tear Down - Involves saving the network traffic which will have been 
recorded during attack execution into a data set, along with restoring the 
virtual network to its original state. If additional attacks are to be recorded, 
then step one to five is repeated, otherwise, the automated evaluation goes to 
step six. 
 
6. Data set Selection - Having acquired all required data sets, the IDSEF will 
select the relevant attack data sets which should be tested against the IDS 
which has been chosen to be evaluated. 
 
7. IDS Evaluator - These attack data sets will then be provided to the IDS under 
test. 
 
8. Next Data set Selection - Assuming there is more than one attack data set to be 
test against steps six and seven will be repeated until all data sets have been 
provided to the IDS. 
 
9.  IDS Result Analyser - All alarms raised by the IDS in testing each of the data 
sets will be logged here. 
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10. Report Generation - Finally, a report is generated which shows the types of 
alarms logged for each of the data sets that were tested against the IDS. 
 
 
Figure 2.5.3 - Steps Carried out in the Automated Evaluation 
The automated evaluation certainly achieves its main goal, which is of providing a 
more up-to-date data set in comparison with the DARPA data set. Furthermore, the 
use of virtual machines allows for both ease of automation and repeatability in 
experiments. However, one main restriction is can be found in this evaluation method. 
As acknowledged by the authors, no background traffic is generated by the VNI, only 
attack traffic (Massiotte et al., 2006, p.1).  As noted by Mell et al. (2003), background 
traffic is essential to evaluating IDSs since without it, the results will only describe 
how effective an IDS is in logging true positives with no indication as to what the 
false positive alarm ratio would be (Mell et al., 2003, p. 14). In other words, an 
evaluation without background traffic will describe how accurate the IDS under test is 
in detecting defined attacks, but no information will be provided on the inaccuracy of 
the IDS – which is whether or not would log attack free traffic as an attack (known as 
a false positive).  
2.5.5 LARIAT Evaluation 
The Lincoln Adaptable Realtime Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT) was 
designed as a follow up to the 1999 DARPA evaluation (Athanasiades, Abler, Levine, 
Owen and Riley, 2003, p. 65) and as described by the authors of this evaluation “two 
design goals were established for LARIAT: (1) support real-time evaluations and (2) 
create a deployable, configurable and easy-to-use testbed (Rossey, Cunningham, 
Fried, Rabek,  Lippmann, Haines and Zissman, 2002, p. 2672).”  
Emphasis on automation of the evaluation was also made by the designers of 
LARIAT. The justification for this is that manual setup and configuration 
requirements when testing IDSs can consume a great deal thus, by automating the 
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evaluation process as much as possible ease-of-use and simplicity is achieved for the 
user carrying out the evaluation (Rossey et al., 2002, p. 2672). In order to achieve this 
aim, the LARIAT evaluation is implemented on top of a Java applet named 
NetworkDirector (Rossey et al., 2002, p. 2677). This acts as a “wrapper” in which a 
GUI interface is built and allows users to interact through the selection of menus and 
buttons rather than having to manually input commands (Figure 2.5.4).  
 
Figure 2.5.4 – Example screenshot of the LARIAT GUI (Rossey et al., 2002) 
The LARIAT evaluation is achieved through the emulation of network traffic (attack 
and background traffic), which is typically seen in a small organisation connected to 
the internet (Athanasiades et al., 2003, p. 65).  What this means is that an IDS under 
evaluation could be placed in between the inside (organisation’s LAN) and outside 
(the internet) network and capture traffic from both sides (Corsini, 2009, p. 38). This 
is exceptionally effective since it reflects the situation in which most IDSs will be 
facing in real life scenarios. 
User input is required only in the first stage of the LARIAT evaluation. During this 
first stage, a user is required to select the “profile” required for background and attack 
traffic (Athanasiades et al., 2003, p. 64). In regards to the selection of background 
traffic, this defines the type of environment the evaluation will take place in, along 
with types of attack free traffic such as HTTP, Telnet, SSH and FTP which should be 
generated (Rossey et al., 2002, p. 2673).  The selection of attack traffic profiles 
involves a similar process in that the user will select specific attacks which should run 
against the IDS under evaluation.  Upon selecting background and attack profiles, the 
system will automatically configure the emulated network and begin the process of 
the testing the IDS under evaluation. 
What can be concluded about the LARIAT implementation is that it provides for a 
very sophisticated evaluation method for IDSs. Not only does it allow users to specify 
both background and attack traffic profiles, the environment in which the IDS under 
test is both realistic and in real-time. Unfortunately, there is one major issue LARIAT. 
As stated by Athanasiades et al. (2003), the LARIAT evaluation is part of a United 
States Government funded project and not available for public use (Athanasiades et 
al., 2003, p. 66). 
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2.5.6 Trident Evaluation 
The main aim of the Trident evaluation is in allowing for variable mix between 
benign and attack traffic (Sommers, Yegneswaran and Barford, 2006, p. 1493). In 
other words, users may specify certain percentages of attack traffic and background 
traffic. As an example, users may specify a test with 10% attack traffic and 90% 
benign traffic to see whether the high level of background traffic will have any 
detrimental effect in the IDSs ability in detecting attacks. 
This is achieved using the Malicious Traffic Composition Environment (MACE), 
written in the Python programming language, which is a tool used for generating 
attacks on a network (Sommers, Yegneswaran and Barford, 2004, p. 83)  and 
Harpoon, a background traffic generator use to  create TCP packet flows and also 
UDP traffic (Sommers & Barford, 2004, p. 68). Both MACE and Harpoon were 
developed during separate periods of time but are used in conjunction for the Trident 
framework (Figure 2.5.5).   
 
 
Figure 2.5.5 – Trident Framework (Sommers et al., 2004) 
 
The architecture of MACE consists of four main components: exploit model, 
obfuscation model, propagation model and background traffic model. The exploit 
model consists of attacks which target specific vulnerabilities in a system, the 
obfuscation model is used for insertion/evasion attacks and the propagation model 
dictates the range of targets (in the form of IP address) to attack (Sommers et al., 
2004, p. 83). The forth component, background generation, is optional and used for 
generating background traffic (in the case of the Trident evaluation, Harpoon is the 
program used for this purpose).  The exploit and obfuscation components are the two 
main models which define the types of attack capable on MACE, and these attacks are 
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Table 2.5.2 – Taxonomy of MACE attacks (Sommers et al., 2004) 
 
In the Trident evaluation, the function of MACE is more or less the same in that it is 
used to generate exploits. However, along with MACE, the Trident evaluation extends 
the attack database by including the ability to also play back 58 of the attacks used in 
the DARPA evaluation (Sommers et al., 2006. p. 1493). This is realised in the tool 
which the authors have named “attack-replay”, and functions similar to Tcpreplay. 
Harpoon, the traffic generation tool, consists of two main features: the ability to (1) 
generate packet traffic at the IP flow level through manual configuration and (2) 
automatically configure itself to represent the flow of packets in a specific network if 
NetFlow data is provided (Sommers & Barford, 2004, p. 68).    
In regards to the first feature, an IP flow, as defined by Quittek, Zseby, Claise and 
Zander (2004) is a “set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network 
during a certain time interval.  All packets belonging   to a particular flow have a set 
of common properties (Quittek et al., 2003, p. 3).” The observation point can be 
devices such as switches and routers, and what Harpoon does is create unidirectional 
TCP packet flows between these devices to simulate network traffic activity. The 
second feature of Harpoon is similar to the first, but, instead of users defining the 
UDP and TCP packet flows, Harpoon may extract NetFlow data logs from routers 
which would have been previously collected and automatically configure the tool so 
that the traffic being generated would reflect the scenario previously seen by the 
router (Sommers & Barford, 2004, p. 69). 
As mention earlier in this section Harpoon is used for the generation of benign traffic 
for the Trident evaluation, but the method used here is a lot more advanced than what 
the tool could previously achieve. For the generation of benign traffic, Sommers et al. 
(2006) have derived a component named the Automata Generation. This utility first 
describes the process involved in an application protocol establishing a connection, 
the exchange of data between client and server is then described and finally, the steps 
involved in ending the connection is described (Sommers et al., 2006, p. 1492). 
Network data sets are fed to this utility and individual packets from the same 
application state will be individually extracted and sanitized to normalise the data. 
Thus, what results from a large data set will be individual network traces including 
HTTP, SMTP, DNS, Telnet, FTP and SSH exchanges. Finally, at this point, each of 
these traces can be given to Harpoon to be transmitted on the network. The automata 
previously created will be used by Harpoon to play back the traffic. 
To summarise the Trident evaluation, the usage of MACE and Harpoon allows for a 
fine control between benign and attack traffic along with mixing them in a realistic 
manner. However, one main critique should be made against this evaluation method, 
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especially in regards to MACE. Although a wide taxonomy of attacks has been 
defined, it should be noted that these are attacks have been specifically coded and 
crafted for researchers to evaluate IDSs. In other words, what this evaluation may end 
up assessing is how effective an IDS is, in detecting attacks generated by MACE but 
not attacks from programs found widely on the internet. There is also a minor critique 
on the traffic generator, Harpoon. From the work of Corsini (2009), the author states 
that Harpoon lacks realism since it always uses the same port number for 
communication (Corsini, 2009, p. 37), an attribute which would not occur in real life 
network traffic. However, it should be noted that it is unclear whether this problem 
exists in the Trident evaluation. 
2.5.7 Metrics for Evaluation 
The term metrics relates to a form of measurement which is used to assess the 
performance of an IDS after it has been put through testing (Ranum, 2001, p. 2). 
Many metrics have been suggested, and are used, for the evaluation of IDSs.  
In the work of Fink, Chappell, Turner and O'Donoghue (2002) the author attempts to 
categorise metrics into three main classes: Logistical, Architectural and Performance 
(Fink, et al., 2002, p. 5-6).  In terms of logistical metrics, this relates to how easy the 
IDS are to setup, maintain and implement into the environment it is intended for. 
Architectural metrics relates to what the actual intention of the IDS is such as whether 
it is a host-based IDS or network-based IDS along with the method in which it detects 
intrusions such as misuse or anomaly detection. In terms of performance metrics, this 
includes the interoperability between IDS and firewalls/routers along with observed 
false-positive and false-negative ratios.  
What should be noted in the metrics defined by Fink et al. (2002) is the fact they 
appear much more suited for usage from an administrative and managerial perspective 
when it comes to choosing what type of IDS should be implemented in an 
organisation or company. Furthermore, as noted by the authors themselves, some of 
the metrics defined may be quite difficult to measure (Fink et al., 2002, p. 8). For 
example, how does one go about defining a metric which is able to measure the 
interoperability between IDSs and firewalls/routers? Furthermore, what type of metric 
will allow a tester to measure the ease of setup of an IDS which results in a reliable 
score each and every time?  
More relevant is the work of Sommers et al., (2005) in which the authors evaluated 
IDSs using two main metrics: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency is a measure of 
false-positives whilst effectiveness is a measure of false-negatives (Corsini, 2009, p. 
23). Figure 2.5.6 demonstrates the formulae used to work out each metric. In both 











Figure 2.5.6 - Formula for working out Efficiency and Effectiveness Metric 
(Sommers et al., 2005) 
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CPU utilization, memory usage and packet loss are also monitored. In the case of 
CPU and packet loss metric, the purpose is to see what relationship either one will 
have against variable traffic flows (Sommers et al., 2005, p. 10). The idea of packet 
loss being an important metric is further elaborated in the work by Graves, Buchanan, 
Saliou and Old (2006). As noted, the omission of packets means less information will 
be provided for forensic systems security as a form of evidence logging (Corsini, 
2009, p. 23). In other words, if packets are lost by the IDS, there is less evidence of an 
attack taking place since no log of the attack may exist. 
In a slightly more recent piece of work, similarities on the metrics defined for 
evaluating IDSs can be found in the work by Gadelrab and El Kalam Abou (2006) in 
comparison with Sommers et al. (2005). In the work of Gadelrab and El Kalam Abou 
(2006), the authors attempt to split up evaluation metrics into two categories: 
detection related metrics, and resource utilization metrics. Detection related metrics 
are used to assess how well particular components of a IDS function, whilst resource 
utilization relates to what system impact the IDS will have whilst running – in other 
words, performance metrics. Furthermore, the detection related metrics are further 
broken down into two subgroups known as macroscopic and microscopic detection 
metrics (Gadelrab & El Kalam Abou, 2006, p. 273-274).  Macroscopic group relates 
to assessing how well the IDS performed in detecting attacks overall, whilst 
microscopic relates to assessing how well the IDS performed in detecting individual 
attacks.  Table 2.5.3 shows the metrics suggested in this work and how they are 
calculated. 
 
Table 2.5.3 – Detection and Resource-Utilization Metrics (Gadelrab & El Kalam 
Abou, 2006) 
Detection Related Metrics  Definition 
 Macroscopic: 
Detection Ratio DR = (Number of detected attacks / Total 
number of attacks included in data set) 
False Alarm Ratio FAR = (Number of generated false alarms / 
total number of generated alarms) 
 Microscopic: 
Detection Ratio per attack Type (Number of Detected attacks of a particular type 
/ total number of attacks of this type) 
False Alarm Ratio per Attack Type (Number of generated false alarm for particular 
attack type / total number of generated false 
alarms) 
Captured Events / Non Detected 
Attacks 
Number of undetected attacks whose events are 
captured / Total number of undetected attacks 
Non Captured Events / Detected 
Attacks 
Number of attacks who events were not 
captured / total number of undetected attacks 
Intrusive Events Drop Ratio (Number of non captured intrusive events / 
Total number of intrusive events) 
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Resource-Utilization Metrics  
CPU Utilization Percent of CPU used by IDS 
Memory Utilization Percent of memory (RAM) used by IDS 
 
From table presented, we can see that some the metrics defined by Gadelrab and El 
Kalam Abou (2006) are quite similar to the ones defined by Sommers et al. (2005). 
For example, resource-utilization metrics of CPU and Memory are exactly the same. 
However, one noted issue with the detection metrics defined by Gadelrab and El 
Kalam Abou (2006) is the Detection Ratio metric. This is the number of detected 
attacks divided by total number of attacks included in the data set. In scenarios 
whereby a data set of attacks is not used, this metric would be relatively difficult to 
calculate since live traffic is unpredictable. However, the work of Gadelrab and El 
Kalam Abou (2006) does provide for clearer distinction between the different types of 
performance metrics by sub-dividing them into two main categories: Detection 
Related Metrics and Resource-Utilization Metrics. 
As a summary to this section, what should be apparent is the fact that a quite a large 
number of metrics have been defined by various authors for the evaluation of IDSs. 
One very good point was made by Ranum (2001) in which he states “Knowing what 
not to measure is sometimes a harder problem than known what to measure (Ranum, 
2001, p. 3).” To put it another way, the most important factor when it comes to 
defining metrics is to ensure that they are relevant and they provide a meaningful 
purpose for the testing which will be carried out on an IDS. With this in mind, it is 
believed that there is no correct or comprehensive set of metrics which will work for 
all forms of evaluation of IDS. Instead, the metrics which are defined is dependent on 
the testing, objective and goal of the evaluation.  
 
2.6 IDS Testing Related Tools and Programs 
There are existing tools and programs which are designed can be used for carrying out 
evaluation of IDSs. These tools and programs generally focus on testing of NIDSs. 
Such works include Nidsbench created by Anzen Computing (1999), IDSwakeup 
created by Aubert (2002) and the Metasploit framework created by Metasploit Project 
(2009).  
It must be noted that although these tools and programs may be used to evaluate an 
IDS, the actual process of the evaluation along with the metrics of evaluation is 
entirely up to the end user. In other words, they do not represent a comprehensive 
evaluation methodology of any kind. However, at the same time, it is still worth 
providing an analysis in order gain an understanding of some techniques which may 
be employed to test IDSs.  
2.6.1 NIDSbench 
In the work of Anzen Computing (1999), the NIDSbench toolkit is presented with the 
purpose of testing NIDSs using two main programs: tcpreplay and fragrouter. Being a 
toolkit, users are required to specify and provide their own data sets along with 
manual configuration of fragrouter which is used for the purpose of creating 
invasion/insertion attacks against an IDS. Due to it being released in 1999, this toolkit 
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is exceptionally out of date since the successor to fragrouter, known as fragroute 
(Song, 2009), is now actually part of the Tcpreplay package therefore NIDSbench can 
be considered redundant.  
2.6.2 IDSwakeup 
IDSwakeup is a tool created by Aubert (2002) which, using Hping2 (an earlier version 
of Hping3), allows for generation of attacks including various types of DoS attacks. 
Furthermore, due to the capabilities of Hping2, packet cans be also crafted to mimic 
more complex attacks. As an example, a packet may be crafted to mimic a 
HTTP_GET command which could be an indication of an attacker attempting to 
perform some exploit on a website. The main advantage in the use of this tool is that 
the attacks are predefined therefore, users can simply specify the target to invoke 
attacks on and IDSwakeup will take care of the commands to run using Hping2 to 
create the attacks. The obvious limitation is that the tools purpose is in generation of 
attacks therefore no background traffic element exists. 
2.6.3 Metasploit Framework 
The Metasploit Framework is part of the Metasploit Project (2009). This tool is quite 
similar to Trident, described in Section 2.5.6, in that it provides for libraries of attacks 
(Sommers et al., 2005, p. 2). One area in which Metasploit could be considered 
superior to the attacks generated by Trident is that it is open source therefore it may 
be updated and maintained far more frequently. Furthermore, another advantage in the 
Metasploit Framework is that a graphical user interface is provided to the user. This 
allows for ease of automation for the user, since they do not need to enter commands 
manually, when carrying out testing along with ease of use. Of course this framework 
is limited to exploit generation only therefore a methodology is still required for 
effective evaluation of IDSs. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has met the main aim of analysing the methodologies used in evaluating 
IDSs along with providing background to subjects related to this topic.  Section 2.5.3 
reviewed the offline DARPA evaluation which, although provided significant 
advances in the research of evaluating NIDSs, is unfortunately flawed due to having a 
lack of both realism in network traffic and meaningful evaluation metrics.  
In the Automated evaluation, reviewed in Section 2.5.4, emphasis was made on 
creating and capturing attack data sets by emulating network topologies through the 
usage of virtual machines for offline evaluation of NIDSs. The ease of repeatability in 
this evaluation along with automation of tasks are the main advantages, but the lack of 
background network traffic means the evaluation does not closely reflect real world 
networks.   
Section 2.5.5 looks at the real-time evaluation named LARIAT which proves ideal 
having both realistic attack and background traffic but, it is not available for public 
use. This is amended in the Trident evaluation, Section 2.5.6, in which both attack and 
traffic generation tools (MACE and Harpoon) are available to the public as long as (in 
the case of MACE) there is a legitimate purpose for using them. However, it was also 
demonstrated that Harpoon may not provide for realistic background traffic and the 
tool MACE does not provide for surveillance/probing attacks in its taxonomy.  
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It can be seen that current existing methodologies that are used for evaluation IDSs all 
contain some form of shortcoming.  Ideally, the LARIAT evaluation may actually 
have achieved a solid methodology, yet the limitation here is that it is unavailable for 
public use. However, it should be acknowledged that many good points have been 
made from the methodologies which have been reviewed. In terms of the DARPA 
evaluation, the critique carried out by McHugh (2003) has highlighted the need for 
both realistic attack and background traffic. This is again emphasized in the work by 
Sommers et al. (2005) during the Trident evaluation. The work carried out by Rossey 
et al. (2002) has made a very good point in that an evaluation methodology should be 
as automated as much as possible along with providing ease of use through the 
implementation of a GUI wrapper. The idea of automation is further backed up in the 
Automated evaluation carried out by Massicotte et al. (2006) in which they use scripts 
to automate the evaluation process. 
It must also be emphasized that the definition of meaningful evaluation metrics is 
highly critical.  Having the wrong or limited evaluation metrics could easily mean a 
flawed evaluation methodology which was shown in the DARPA evaluation by 
McHugh (2003). To briefly reiterate from the conclusion of Section 2.5.7, there is no 
“correct” metrics, only metrics which have meaningful relevance to the purpose of the 
evaluation. 
To conclude, if we are to focus specifically on the strengths of each evaluation 
methodology, along with taking into consideration the importance of defining the 
correct evaluation metrics, it can be summarised that a methodology in evaluating 
IDSs must consist of the following requirements: 
 
1. Inclusion of Realistic Attack and Background Network Traffic 
2. Ease of Automation 
3. Inclusion of Meaningful Metrics for Evaluation 
The main aim in this project is to produce a prototype framework which is capable of 
carrying out evaluation an NIDS. Based on the conclusion reached in this literature 
review, a framework must include all three requirements which have been listed to 
provide for an effective evaluation of NIDSs.  The next chapter will describe such a 
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3 Design 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature concluded that an effective methodology in evaluating IDSs must 
consist of the following three main requirements: 
 
1. Inclusion of Realistic Attack and Background Network Traffic 
2. Ease of Automation 
3. Inclusion of Meaningful Metrics for Evaluation 
This chapter outlines the design of a prototype framework which attempts to meet all 
three requirements for the evaluation of an NIDS. The proposed framework allows for 
a black-box evaluation of the signature-based NIDS known as Snort whilst attempting 
to follow the three requirements listed as rigorously as possible. 
Snort has been chosen since it is freely obtained and widely supported.  Furthermore, 
a huge amount of predefined rules are available for download from Sourcefire (2009) 
produced by the Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team (VRT). This makes it a lot 
simpler to test against, since there is no need to craft user-defined rules in order to test 
for false-positives. The methodologies reviewed in the literature, including works by 
Sommers et al. (2004); Sommers et al. (2006) and Massicotte et al. (2006) all 
performed testing against Snort. Thus, it can be said that this IDS is perhaps the most 
popular choice among researchers making it viable for evaluation in this project.  
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the prototype framework, along with a brief 
summarisation on design choices made. Furthermore, a schematic of how such the 
framework functions is provided. A more detailed description of the design choices is 
then described. Section 3.3 looks in-depth at the design for the inclusion of attack and 
background network traffic whilst Section 3.4 provides a solution for the ease of 
automation. Finally, Section 3.5 defines the metrics for the evaluation. Justification 
for the design choices made is provided in each section. Finally, a conclusion to this 
chapter is provided in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Prototype Framework Overview 
As shown in the introduction to this chapter, there is a need for both realistic attack 
and background traffic when evaluating an IDS. This is especially true in the case of 
evaluating a NIDS, since the whole purpose of such a system is to monitor network 
traffic (see Section 2.3.3). The second requirement of automation is also of 
importance. Automation allows for ease of use for the user, in terms of configuration, 
along with repeatability in experiments. The third requirement, defining the correct 
metrics for evaluation, is critical as it allows the user to come to a meaningful 
conclusion after evaluation of an IDS is complete. 
Based on the three requirements a framework (Figure 3.2.1) is presented along with a 
schematic on how it should function (Figure 3.2.2). Three main components are 
specified: the attack traffic component, background traffic component and evaluation 
metrics component. Furthermore, a GUI element is shown which wraps all these 
components into a single application. 
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Figure 3.2.1 – Prototype Framework  
 
 
Figure 3.2.2 – Abstract Schematic 
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In regards to the attack traffic component, it was decided that the usage of publicly 
available programs should and tools would be put to use in order to generate attack 
traffic in a real-time manner. It is believed that this will provide for the most realistic 
scenario in testing an IDS. Some of the tools which are used for this application were 
described in Section 2.4 and include: Nmap, Hydra and Hping3 for the generation of 
attack traffic. In the background traffic component, attack free data sets are used to 
generate benign traffic. Live background traffic is both difficult to manage and 
control in testing environments, therefore, the use of attack free data sets – to be 
played back using the tool Tcpreplay – will provide ease of repeatability and 
predictable flow of traffic.  
For the evaluation metrics component, the categories of Detection and Resource 
Utilization metrics, as defined by Gadelrab and El Kalam Abou (2006), will be 
monitored. This includes the efficiency, effectiveness, packet loss, CPU utilization 
and memory usage metrics which were originally defined by Sommers et al. (2005). 
Retrieval of logs produced by the IDS under evaluation and generation of detection 
metrics are also part of this framework. Resource-utilisation metrics will be monitored 
directly by the user on the IDS host.  
Finally, in order to meet the requirement of automation, a Graphical User Interface is 
developed which “wraps” the three components previously described together to form 
the framework as a whole. Thus, rather than have a user individually program, 
configure and run each component independently, a GUI with the relevant options 
will be provided as the front end of this application framework so that evaluation of a 
IDS may take place through a simple click of a few buttons. The GUI is implemented 
in Visual Studio 2008 and the programming language C#.  
A broad overview of this prototype framework has been given. The next section will 
provide a much more detailed description on the design along with justifications for 
the choices made. 
 
3.3 Attack and Background Traffic Component Design 
In terms of Attack Traffic component, it has been decided that the use of live attacks 
will provide for the most realistic scenario in testing an IDS. The literature review 
provided description of the most common network threat which, to briefly reiterate, 
include threats of surveillance/probing, user privilege gain, DoS attacks and malicious 
software (worms, viruses and Trojan horses).  
In each of the techniques, with the exception of malicious software, an example 
program has been given which will allow for the generation of live attacks in regards 
to that network threat category. Due to the security issues which may arise from using 
real malicious software, the tool Hping3 will be used to craft packets which reflect 
these threats instead. This packet crafting technique is both similar and influenced by 
the implementation carried out in the NIDSWakeup tool. However, the design here 
differs in that Hping3 is used for the crafting of malicious software, a feature which 
NIDSWakeup does not have. 
The Metasploit Framework was considered for generation of attack traffic. However, 
it was decided that it was not feasible to implement. Although it is open source, it was 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  43 
assessed that the time required to analyse, understand and integrate the code would be 
too complex a task given the time available for this project.  
Through the use of readily available tools and programs, the most realistic attack 
traffic possible can be achieved since it will be generated in real-time. Table 3.3.1 
provides a list of attacks which will be part of this framework along with the tools and 
programs which are used to generate the actual attacks. 
Table 3.3.1- Attacks Included in Application System 
Category Tool/Program to be used 
Surveillance/Probing Nmap 
User Privilege Gain Hydra 
Malicious Software Hping3 
Denial of Service Hping3 
 
Regarding the Background Traffic Component, achieving realistic and controlled 
generation of benign traffic is still very much an open issue. The closest available tool 
which will allow for realistic generation of background traffic is found in the work of 
Sommers et al. (2005) using Harpoon. Unfortunately, it was dismissed as not being 
realistic enough due to using the same port in every connection by Corsini (2009).  
Another factor, which should not be considered a limitation but more of a hindrance is 
that getting Harpoon to run requires a lot of effort by the end user. NetFlow logs may 
be used but in the case of them not being available users must manually create their 
own topologies and configurations.  
Therefore, due to such factors, it was decided that this framework would use attack 
free data sets for playback of background traffic through Tcpreplay instead of 
Harpoon. Two main justifications exist for this choice. Firstly, the ease of 
repeatability will be achieved in playing back the traffic (since the data set will never 
change in each test) and it will also allow for variable playback speeds in order to 
assess whether the IDS’s performance in regards to the metrics defined will be 
detrimental in the case of high traffic volumes. Of course, the limitation here is that 
the only publicly available data set is the ones released by DARPA meaning any 
evaluation carried using this framework at this point in time is restricted to the 
DARPA data set. 
It is acknowledged that the literature review has dismissed the DARPA data set as 
being unrealistic. However, with no other option, this is the only choice which 
remains. But, what must be made clear here is that this framework is not limited to 
only the DARPA data set. As the tool used to generate background traffic is 
Tcpreplay, users are free to provide their own data sets to use instead. Furthermore, it 
leaves the framework open to extension since it may take advantage of newer more 
realistic data sets, if one is ever released, in the future without any need to modify the 
design of the framework. 
3.4 Automation Wrapper Design 
Automation is a highly desirable attribute in evaluation of IDSs as demonstrated by 
various methodologies carried out in the literature review including Rossey et al. 
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(2002) and Massicotte et al. (2006). To justify, consider the example of using 
Tcpreplay to playback background traffic. A user must first prepare a cache file of the 
data set then rewrite the traffic (which may consist of both IP and MAC addresses 
being rewritten) and then finally define the actual playback options. All these tasks 
must be carried out in command line which adds to both the difficulty and confusion 
in using such a tool.  
Thus, in order to meet the requirement of automation, this framework wraps all 
programs and functions around a Graphical User Interface. Therefore, rather than 
having to enter commands individually, a user may be presented with an application 
where they simply need to select the required options under forms and buttons. Once 
all configurations have been made, a simple click of a button will allow for generation 
of traffic (attack and background) to be sent to the IDS under evaluation.  
The use of the programming language C# is used to construct a Windows Form GUI. 
As almost all programs which are part of this framework will require a Linux/Unix 
environment the application developed in C# will runs using Mono (Mono Project, 
2009) which is an open source .NET compatible Common Runtime Language (CLR) 
designed for the Linux/Unix/Mac OS X/Solaris/Windows platforms.  
 
3.5 Evaluation Metrics Component Design 
As the literature review demonstrated, choosing the right metrics to evaluate an IDS is 
critical in order to assess it in a meaningful way. Taking this into consideration, this 
framework employs the metrics of efficiency and effectiveness as defined by 
Sommers et al. (2005) along with CPU Utilization and Memory usage metrics. 
Furthermore, packet loss, described by Graves et al. (2006) is an important metric, as 
demonstrated in the literature review, hence its inclusion. If we apply the 
categorisation of metrics, as defined by Gadelrab and El Kalam Abou (2006), the 
metrics of efficiency, effectiveness and packet loss can be considered Detection 
Metrics, whilst CPU and Memory usage can be grouped as Resource Utilisation 
Metrics (Table 3.5.1). 
Table 3.5.1 – Evaluation Metrics Design 
Detection Metrics Description 
Efficiency True-Positives / All Alarms 
Effectiveness True-Positives / All Positives 
Packet Loss The number of packets lost, as reported 
by the IDS 
Resource Utilisation Metrics  
CPU Usage Percentage of CPU used 
Memory Usage Percentage of memory used 
 
Implementing the efficiency and effectiveness metrics allows for the monitoring of 
both false-positive and false-negative ratios. In other words, we can assess whether 
the IDS under evaluation will trigger alerts against benign traffic (false-positives) and 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  45 
whether it will miss real attacks (false-negatives). To perform these calculations, a 
baseline of expect alarms must first be established. Users will be required to manually 
run individual attacks against the IDS to assess what this baseline result will be for 
each attack. 
Monitoring of packet-loss allows for assessing whether the IDS can successfully 
monitor all traffic even in high throughput. The CPU and Memory of the system in 
which the IDS resides is also monitored to see whether higher resource utilisation 
results in any detrimental effect to the IDS (such as detection of attacks). 
For the purpose of automation, this framework allows automated retrieval of logs 
produced by the NIDS Snort using a Secure Shell (SSH) connection. All required logs 
are copied to the machine in which the framework resides and Detection Metrics are 
automatically generated based on the results parsed in these logs. 
One limitation in the current design of the framework is that Resource Utilisation 
metrics will still need to be monitored manually. This may easily be achieved in 
multiple ways. For example, on the Windows operating system, the Windows Task 
Manager will provide a user with ample information in regards to both memory and 
CPU usage. The same applies for Linux/Unix environments, with tools such as top 
and vmstat which generally achieve the same functions as the Windows Task 
Manager but is command-line driven. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The main goal in this chapter is to present a framework for the evaluation of NIDSs 
along with a detailing the design choices made which would adhere to the three main 
requirements required for a solid methodology in evaluating IDSs. The three 
requirements consist of: 
 
1. Inclusion of Realistic Attack and Background Network Traffic 
2. Ease of Automation 
3. Inclusion of Meaningful Metrics for Evaluation 
This chapter provided an overview of the framework along with the schematic on how 
it functions. Furthermore, design choices and justifications were made for each of 
three components of the framework.  
The framework allows for the inclusion of realistic attack traffic generation by 
making use of existing programs to carry out live attacks whilst background traffic is 
achieved by using Tcpreplay and a user provided data set. The metrics of efficiency, 
effectiveness, packet loss, CPU utilisation and memory usage are all part of the design 
of this framework which will allow for meaningful comparisons to be made such as 
whether higher resource utilisation results in any detrimental effect against detection 
of attacks. By wrapping all functions into a GUI application created using Microsoft 
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4 Implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
The design of a prototype framework for the evaluation of an NIDS was described in 
the previous chapter. This chapter will show how the framework was actually 
implemented. Snippets of coding are provided to demonstrate the functions carried 
out by the framework.  As the previous chapter showed, three main components of the 
framework exist including: 
 Attack Traffic Component 
 Background Traffic Component 
 Evaluation Metrics Component 
On top of these three components, a GUI has been built which wraps all functions into 
a singular application. The purpose of this GUI is to provide automation of carrying 
out the evaluation process along with providing ease-of-use. To provide for a brief 
overview of the implementation, the next section will first focus on providing a 
description of this GUI. 
4.2 GUI Implementation  
The following figure presents a screenshot of the completed GUI (Figure 4.2.1). As 
the figure presented shows, the three main components to this framework include the 
attack traffic component, background traffic component and the evaluation metrics 
component. Each of the three components is clearly separated with the use of tabs. 
Within each component, multiple subcategories exist which are once again separated 
by tabs. These subcategories offer the user configuration options along with clearly 
marked buttons with purposes including invoking attacks, as the figure shows, or 
inputting configuration changes. 
 
Figure 4.2.1 - Screenshot of Framework 
To the right hand side of the application, a Bash Output textbox is presented. Bash is 
the shell scripting environment used by many Linux distributions (Newham and 
Rosenblatt, 1998, p. 4) and the purpose of this textbox is to display any output which 
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is redirected from the Bash shell. This allows us to be aware of any information which 
is produced when running the application. 
As the introduction to this chapter has described, the GUI for this framework is 
implemented under Microsoft C# .NET using Visual Studio 2008. Visual Studio 2008 
offers a drag-and-drop environment for building a GUI, thus all code is automatically 
generated when the GUI is built. Therefore, it does not prove viable to provide the 
code behind the GUI since it is all arbitrary.  
 
4.3 Shell Process Implementation 
In order to run Bash commands under the C# programming language, a process must 
be created to invoke a Bash shell. The code used is a modified version of the 
ProcessCaller originally provided by Mayer (2003). 
 
private ProcessCaller processCaller; 
 
public void runBashCommand(string arguments) 
{ 
processCaller = new ProcessCaller(this); 
processCaller.FileName = "bash"; 
processCaller.Arguments = arguments; 
      processCaller.StdErrReceived += new   
      DataReceivedHandler(writeStreamInfo); 
      processCaller.StdOutReceived += new                      
DataReceivedHandler(writeStreamInfo); 
processCaller.Completed += new  
EventHandler(processCompletedOrCanceled); 
processCaller.Cancelled += new  
EventHandler(processCompletedOrCanceled); 
this.status.Text = Environment.NewLine; 
processCaller.Start(); 
} 
This code will call a new process with the processCaller.FileName set to “bash”. 
Any arguments given will be passed to a Bash shell. All output from Bash will then 
be redirected to this.status.Text which is the Bash Output textbox described in 
Section 4.2. To give an example, the following code will use the process caller and 
print “hello world” to the Bash Output textbox. The –c flag is used to read a string 
input as a command. 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' "+"echo hello world"+" ' "); 
 
4.4 Attack Traffic Component Implementation  
In the attack traffic component, four subcategories which are separated by tabs exist. 
These subsections are labelled Surveillance/Probing, User Privilege Gain, Malicious 
Software and Denial of Service. As Section 3.3 demonstrated, the purpose of each of 
these subsections is to invoke a specific category of live attack. The tools used for the 
attack traffic component implementation include Nmap, Hydra and Hping3. 
Within each subsection, a checkbox with the text “Enabled” is provided. If this 
checkbox is checked, then the attack is considered active and will be invoked once the 
“Invoke Attack(s)” button is pressed, otherwise, the attack is not carried out.  
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private void runAttackBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{             
if (surprobChkBox.Checked == true) 
{ 
            ... 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + nmap_ping + " ' "); 
      this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + nmap_syn + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + nmap_udp + " ' "); 
} 
if (usrGainChkBox.Checked == true) 
      { 
      ... 
      this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hydraTelnetCommand + " ' "); 
      this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hydraFTPCommand + " ' "); 
} 
if (dosChkBox.Checked == true) 
{ 
            ... 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + Hping3_ping + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + Hping3_SYN + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + Hping3_LAND + " ' "); 
      } 
if (malsoftwareChkBox.Checked == true) 
{ 
            ... 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + qaz + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + sober + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + deepthroat + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + waledac + " ' ");                 
      } 
 
4.4.1 Surveillance/Probing Implementation 
The Surveillance/Probing subcategory is implemented using Nmap. Users are able to 
carry out a default port scan. Upon enabling the attack, entering the IP address of the 
attack target the command textboxes will automatically update itself to reflect the 
bash command which will be carried out upon pressing the “Invoke Attack(s)” button.  
The code implemented is shown as follows: 
 
private void nmapTarget_TextChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
         ... 
         nmapScanCommandBox.Text = "nmap " + target; 
  } 
        
Optionally, if the command presented in the command box is not desirable this can be 
simply edited. The target is a string variable, and will contain an IP address. An 
example of Nmap configured to carry out a scan on the network 192.168.1.0/24 is 
shown in Figure 4.4.1. 
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Figure 4.4.1 – Example Configuration of Surveillance/Probing 
The string presented in each of the Command boxes will be read and parsed to a bash 
shell once the “Invoke Attack(s)” button is pressed.  If a certain scan is not checked, 
then its’ command box will default to empty hence no attack will be ran in that type 
of attack. This idea is applied for each of the other three attacks also. 
4.4.2 User Privilege Gain Implementation 
The tool Hydra is used in order to create user privilege gain attacks. Hydra allows for 
a dictionary brute force attack on multiple protocols, including Telnet, HTTP, FTP, 
SSH as examples. This application has implemented Telnet and FTP brute force 
attacks only. Users are free to edit the command box to invoke attacks on other 
protocols. 
An example configuration of Hydra which invokes a dictionary attack against target 
192.168.1.1 using the password file “password.txt” and be carried out on both the 
Telnet and FTP protocol is shown (Figure 4.4.2). It should be noted that the 
password.txt file must be provided manually. This should contain a list of all phrases 
which Hydra should attempt to use as a password against the target.  
 
Figure 4.4.2 – Example Configuration of User Privilege Gain Attacks 
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The target IP address, username and a text file containing a list of passwords is 
required to carry out a brute force dictionary attack.  Upon selecting which protocols 
the attack should be carried out against the Command Box will once again 
automatically update itself to reflect the bash command which will be used.  
 
private void hydraTelnet_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
... 
if (hydraTelnet.Checked == true) 
   { 
         this.hydraTelnetCommandBox.Text = "hydra -l " + username      
   + " -P " + passwordList + " " + target + " telnet"; 
   } 
else 
this.hydraTelnetCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
 
private void hydraFTP_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
... 
if (hydraFTP.Checked == true) 
   { 
   this.hydraFTPCommandBox.Text = "hydra -l " + username + " -P  
   " + passwordList + " " + target + " ftp"; 
   } 
else 
      this.hydraFTPCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
4.4.3 Malicious Software Implementation 
Malicious software consists of worms, viruses and Trojan horses. The issue with 
implementing this category of attack is that there is a great security risk if actual 
malicious software was used in testing the IDS. Therefore, instead of using real 
worms or viruses, this category of attack is achieved by packet crafting through 
Hping3.  
Malicious software can be identified via their propagation signatures (Buchannan, 
2009, p. 50) therefore, packets can be crafted using Hping3 that carry out, and 
contain, the same patterns that a malicious software would have. Four types of 
malicious software attacks are implemented for this application. This includes Qaz 
Worm, Waledac Virus, Sober Virus and Deepthroat Trojan. The code used to craft 
such software, via Hping3, is shown as follows: 
 
private void qaz_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{        
  ...   
        if (qaz.Checked == true) 
        { 
        this.qazCommandBox.Text = "Hping33 -I eth0 -A " + target + "    
        –p 139 -e 'qazwsx.hsq' -c 1"; 
        } 
        else 
          this.qazCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
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private void waledac_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
    ... 
         if (waledac.Checked == true) 
            { 
            this.waledacCommandBox.Text = "Hping33 -I eth0 " + target  
            + " -p 80 -e 'X-request-kind-code:' -c 1"; 
            } 
            else 
              this.waledacCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
 
private void sober_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
     ... 
          if (sober.Checked == true) 
             { 
             this.soberCommandBox.Text = "Hping33 -I eth0 –S "  
              + target + "-p 37 –e '.exe' -c 1"; 
       } 
             else 
               this.soberCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
private void deepthroat_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
  ... 
  if (deepthroat.Checked == true) 
           { 
           this.deepthroatCommandBox.Text = "Hping33 -I eth0 -2  
           "+target+ " -p 3150 -e '00' -c 1"; 
           } 
            else 
              this.deepthroatCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
In the crafting of the Qaz virus, Waledac worm and Deepthroat Trojan, the text which 
follows the –e flag contains the unique signature of that specific attack. Furthermore, 
the the tcp flag (-S for SYN flag) and ports (-p flag) which each of these 
malicious attacks would attempt to connect to is predefined. In the Deepthroat Trojan, 
the -2 flag specifies a packet to be sent in UDP mode. Additionally, it should be 
noted that in each of the predefined attacks, the default output interface used is eth0, 
specified via the –I flag. This is the default interface alias provided in most Linux 
distributions. Of course, if that does not apply the editing the command box to reflect 
the machines network interface alias is possible. 
To provide for an example, Figure 4.4.3 shows three of four malicious attacks being 
configured to be run against 192.168.1.1. 
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Figure 4.4.3 – Example configuration of Malicious Software Attack 
 
4.4.4 Denial of Service Implementation 
Hping3 is once again used for the implementation of Denial of Service attacks. Three 
main kinds of DoS attacks implemented include SYN flood, PING flood and LAND 
attack.  As with the previous attack implementations, once a user selects the attack 
target (and a spoofed IP address in the case of a SYN flood using the –a flag) and the 
type of DoS attack to invoke, the Command box will automatically update itself to 
reflect the Bash command which will be ran. 
 
private void synflood_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
  ... 
if (synflood.Checked == true) 
   { 
   this.Hping3CommandBox.Text = "Hping33 -I eth0 -a " + spoof +    
   " -S " + target + " -p 22 -i u1000 -c 1000"; 
   } 
         else 
     this.hydraFTPCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
 
private void pingflood_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
... 
if (pingflood.Checked == true) 
   { 
   this.Hping3CommandBox.Text = "Hping3 -I eth0 -1 -i u1000 " +  
   target + " -c 1000"; 
   } 
   else 
     this.Hping3PingCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
 
private void landattack_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
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... 
if (landattack.Checked == true) 
   { 
   this.Hping3CommandBox.Text = "Hping3 -S -a" + target + " -p  
   21 " + target + "c -1"; 
   } 
         else 
     this.Hping3LANDCommandBox.Text = null; 
} 
 
In both SYN and PING floods, the default number of request packets sent is 1000 (-c 
1000), at a rate of 1000 microseconds (-i u1000). Although an infinite amount of 
packets may be sent, this creates difficulty in evaluating an IDS in a meaningful way, 
especially in calculating the efficiency and effectiveness metrics defined by Sommers 
et al. (2005).  
Figure 4.4.4 provides an example configuration of Hping33. The configuration shown 
will carry out all three DoS attacks against target 192.168.1.1. A spoofed source IP 
address is required to avoid TCP reset packets from being sent back to the attacker in 
the case of the SYN flood. 
 
 
Figure 4.4.4 – Example Configuration for Denial of Service Attack 
 
 
4.5 Background Traffic Component Implementation  
The background traffic component of this framework is implemented using 
Tcpreplay. Tcpreplay is a suite of tools, and consists of tcprep, tcprewrite, tcpreplay, 
tcpreplay-edit and tcpbridge (Turner & Bing, 2009).  A brief summary of the purpose 
of each tool is provided in the table which follows (Table 4.5.1). A detailed tutorial on 
the usage of Tcpreplay can also be found in the work of Corsini (2009) in which some 
practical examples are given (Corsini, 2009, p. 73 – 79). 
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Table 4.5.1 – Tcpreplay tool suite 
Tool Description 
tcpprep Parses a pcap file (the data set to be used) 
and establishes a client/server 
relationship between each of the packets. 
A cache file is produced which is 
required for the other tools in Tcpreplay. 
tcprewrite Rewrites TCP/IP and Layer 2 information 
on the pcap file provided so that it may 
be routed correctly through a router or 
switch. 
tcpreplay Replays the pcap file on the network. The 
speed of playback may be configured. 
tcpreplay-edit Provides the functionality of tcprewrite 
and tcpreplay as one single command. 
tcpbridge Allows for the bridging of two network 
interfaces. 
 
In regards to this prototype framework’s implementation, the three tools used include: 
tcpprep, tcprewrite and tcpreplay. These are subcategorised by tabs and labelled 
“Preparation”, “Rewrite Traffic” and “Traffic Playback” respectively in the 
application. Figure 4.5.1 provides a representation of the process involved in 
background traffic playback. 
 
Figure 4.5.1 – Background Traffic Playback Process 
Under the “Preparation” tab, tcpprep is used to create a cache file of the pcap file to 
be played back. The IP and MAC addresses are then rewritten so that the data set may 
be routed correctly using tcprewrite under the “Rewrite Traffic” tab. Finally “Traffic 
Playback” invokes tcpreplay in order to playback the background traffic. This process 
is represented in. A detailed description on how Tcpreplay was implemented for this 
application is described next. 
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4.5.1 Tcprep Implementation 
As the previous section demonstrated, the purpose of tcprep is in the prepation of a 
cache file of the data set which is to be played back. This cache file is relatively small, 
and simply provides information differentiating between client and server packets. 
The cache file is required for both tcprewrite and tcpreplay. To create a cache file in 
this application system, the user specifies the location of the data set to be used and 
the output directory of the cache file which is to be produced (Figure 4.5.2).  Upon 
clicking the “Create Cache File” button, the following code is invoked: 
 
private void createCacheBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
... 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "tcpprep " + "-a bridge " + "-i "    
+ input_file + " -o " + output_file + " ' "); 
} 
The code shown above uses the -a bridge flag, which simply means it will  take a 
input_file (the data set), and divide it into a client server relationship and output this 
information as a cache file. The output_file is both the directory in which the file is 
saved to along with the name of the file. 
 
Figure 4.5.2 – Example of tcprep Implementation 
 
4.5.2 Tcprewrite Implementation  
The second subcategory within the background traffic playback component is 
tcprewrite. The purpose of this tool is to parse a data set and rewrite both MAC and IP 
addresses. This process will produce a rewritten data set so that traffic will flow 
successfully through devices including routers, firewalls and switches. The cache file 
(as produced in Section 4.5.1) is also required so that tcprewrite knows which packets 
are the client and which packets are the server when rewriting the pcap file.  The code 
to rewrite a pcap file is shown as follows: 
 
private void rewrite_btn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
... 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "tcprewrite " + "--enet-dmac=" +   
dserverMAC + "," + dclientMAC + " --enet-smac=" + sserverMAC + "," + 
sclientMAC + " -e " + serverIP + serverSubnet + ":" + clientIP + 
clientSubnet + " -C -c " + tcprewritePREP + " -i " + tcprewritePCAP + 
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The code shown above takes a input pcap file and rewrites it based on the TCP/IP and 
Layer 2 information provided (IP and MAC addresses). As an example, Figure 4.5.3 
provides a screenshot of the tcprewrite implementation.  In the figure provided, the 
data set known as data set.pcap will be rewritten as rewritten.pcap. The client of this 
data set will have the source MAC address of 11:11:11:11:11:11 and the server will 
have the source MAC address of 22:22:22:22:22:22. All clients will be assigned an IP 
address within the range of 10.0.20.65 - 10.0.20.126 whilst server IP addresses will be 
within the range of 10.0.10.65 - 10.0.10.126.   
 
 
Figure 4.5.3 – Example Configuration of the tcprewrite Implementation 
4.5.3 Tcpreplay Implementation 
Tcpreplay forms the third and last subcategory of the traffic playback component. It is 
at this stage that playback of the data set will occur. A user specifies a data set and 
cache file (created from Sections 4.5.2and Section 4.5.1respectively) along with the 
output interface for client traffic, and server traffic. Finally, the speed of playback is 
defined based on packets per second along with have many times the data set should 
be played back. The code implementing tcpreplay is as follows: 
 
private void bgtrafficBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
... 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "tcpreplay " + "-l " + loop + " -p " + 
speed + " -i " + intCA + " -I " + intUA + " -c " + cacheLocation + " 
" + datasetLocation + " ' ");  
} 
 
As before, an example is given (Figure 4.5.4). In this example, the data set 
rewritten.pcap will be played back using the cache file prep.cache. All server traffic 
will be played out of interface eth0 whilst client traffic is played out of eth1. A 
playback speed of 2500 packets per second is specified. It will only be played back 
once on the network, as Loop 1 specifies. 
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Figure 4.5.4 – Example of tcpreplay Implementation 
 
4.6 Evaluation Metrics Component Implementation  
Similar to the background traffic component, the implementation of the evaluation 
metrics component of this framework consists of three subcategories separated once 
again by tabs. They are named “Alarm Retrieval”, “Baseline Results” and “Metric 
Generation”. Figure 4.6.1 is provided to provide a diagrammatic representation of the 
processes involved in evaluation metrics component. 
 
Figure 4.6.1 – Evaluation Metrics Component Diagram 
The first subcategory, alarm retrieval, invokes a SSH connection on the system in 
which the IDS is running on. Alarms and log files are then copied over to the system 
in which the application resides. The baseline results subcategory is required in order 
to establish what the expected alarms in each attack should be. The manual input of 
the expected alarms for each category of attack is required. The metric generation 
subcategory is then used to analyse the log files retrieved. Based on the baseline 
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results provided, calculation of efficiency and effectiveness metrics is carried out. The 
metric generation process also returns the result of any packet loss as reported by the 
IDS. 
For this application, as mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 3, the intention is to 
test it against the signature-based IDS Snort. Thus, the evaluation metrics component 
has been coded to tailor specifically for this IDS. However, with a few modifications 
to the code, the component can easily be applied to any other IDS. A detailed report 
on how each of the three subcategories (alarm retrieval, baseline results and report 
generation) is implemented follows. 
4.6.1 Alarm Retrieval  Implementation  
Alarm retrieval performs the function of copying alarms and log files produced by the 
IDS after running the attack/background traffic components. The user is required to 
specify a username and IP address/name of the machine in which the IDS resides on. 
Furthermore, the location (directory path and name of file) of the alarms and logs file 
is required. Upon clicking the “Retrieve Log” button, a SSH connection is invoked 
and the log and alarms file is copied over to the machine in which the application is 
running on. The code carried out is as follows: 
 
private void btnRetrieveLogs_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
{ 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "scp " + username + "@" + target  
+ ":" + remotedirectoryAlarm + filenameAlarm + " " +  
localdirectory + " ' "); 
 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "scp " + username + "@" + target  
+ ":" + remotedirectoryStatistics + filenameStatistics + " " +  
 localdirectory + " ' "); 
 
this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "echo Log has been retrieved" + "  
' "); 
} 
Figure 4.6.2 provides an example of the alarm retrieval implementation. In this 
example, the application will connect to test@192.168.1.118 and copy over alarm.ids 
and stats.log from the directory /home/test/logs/ and save it to /home/user/ids_results/ 
directory on the local machine. 
 
Figure 4.6.2 – Example of Alarm Retrieval Implementation 
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4.6.2 Baseline Results Implementation 
The purpose of the baseline results subcategory is to provide information on expected 
alarms for the generation of effectiveness and efficiency metrics. Figure 4.6.3 
provides a screen shot of what the baseline result subcategory looks like.  
 
Figure 4.6.3 – Example of baseline results Implementation 
As the figure presented shows, each of the four categories of attacks implemented for 
this application are present. To establish a baseline, all attacks which are to be 
evaluated against the IDS must be manually ran against the IDS first – one after the 
other. During this initial baseline test, no background traffic should exist.  
Running a single attack, with no background traffic, should put very little stress on the 
IDS. It is expected at this point that the IDS will detect the attack successfully. 
However, since we are performing black-box testing, we don’t know how many 
alarms the IDS may log for each individual attack; thus we establish a baseline of 
expected alarms. After inputting the expected alarms for each attack, the information 
can then be used in metric generation (see next section) to calculate the metrics of 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Very little code is required for this part of the implementation, with the exception of 
converting the input of expected alarms into an integer variable. This is required in 
order to perform the calculations of metrics in the report generation subcategory 
since, by default, the input of expected alarms will be read as a string variable. The 
code used is as follows: 
 
int dosBaselineAlarm_int = int.Parse(this.dosBaselineAlarms.Text); 
 
int malsoftwareBaselineAlarms_int =                    
int.Parse(this.malsoftwareBaselineAlarms.Text); 
 
int usrPrivBaselineAlarms_int =                        
int.Parse(this.usrPrivBaselineAlarms.Text); 
 
int survBaselineAlarms_int = int.Parse(this.survBaselineAlarms.Text); 
 
4.6.3 Metric Generation Implementation 
It is within this subcategory of the evaluation component in which the efficiency, 
effectiveness and packet loss metrics are generated based on the log files produced by 
the IDS after testing. These log files are known as the alarm log and statistics log, 
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both of which are produced by Snort. As described in Section 4.6.1, the alarm 
retrieval process will take care of acquiring these logs.  
Assuming the files have been retrieved successfully, we simply provide the location 
of the files. Upon clicking the “Calculate” button, the alarm.ids and statistics.log file 
is parsed, and based on the information provided efficiency, effectiveness and packet 
loss metrics are produced automatically as shown in Figure 4.6.4. 
 
Figure 4.6.4 – Metric Generation Example 
 
 In this example, the IDS under test logged 11 TruePositives. Since AllPositives (the 
input from baseline results) and AllAlarms raised were both 11, we have an efficiency 
and effectiveness of 1. The statistics log provided contained no packet loss, thus the 
figure shown reflects this. 
In regards to the code, three methods are invoked when the “Calculate” button is 
pressed which include: findAllAlarmsDetected(), findPacketLoss(), and 
calculateMetrics().  The formulas for calculation of efficiency and effectiveness, as 
described by Sommers et al. (2005), is presented once more for ease of reference 












The purpose of the findAllAlarmsDetected() method is to perform a simple regular 
expression match on the statitics file, in order to find the total alarms raised by the 
IDS under test (AllAlarms). This is achieved using the StreamReader process in C# 
as the code below shows. 
 
public void findAllAlarmsDetected() 
{ 
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... 
StreamReader streamReader = new StreamReader(statisticslog); 
string fileContent = streamReader.ReadToEnd(); 
 
Match match = Regex.Match(fileContent, @"ALERTS: (\d+)"); 
 
if (match.Success) 
            { 
            string capture = match.Groups[1].Captures[0].Value; 
            allAlarms.Text = capture; 
            }  
} 
 
The findPocketLoss() method is very similar, except, instead of matching characters 
after “ALERTS” we perform a match against characters after “DROPPED” which 
will be a numeric value of packets lost as reported by the IDS. 
The calculateMetrics() method is used to perform the calculations required for 
efficiency and effectiveness metrics. Similar to the previous two methods, the 
StreamReader process is used, this time to parse the alarms file. A count of alarms 
raised by each attack is carried out and stored as individual variables using a regular 
expression. This is achieved since each time Snort logs an alert, the alert will contain 
a message describing what the alert logged was. We use a regular expression to count 
how many times certain “messages” show up in the alerts file, hence can calculate 
how many times Snort logged each attack. 
string alarmfile = alarmLog.Text; 
StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(alarmfile);  
string text = sr.ReadToEnd(); 
sr.Close(); 
      
Regex r1 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Portscan" + @"\b", 
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
MatchCollection mc1 = r1.Matches(text); 
.. 
Regex r10 = new Regex(@"\b" + "LAND Attack Detected" + @"\b", 
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 




 The total amount of detected attacks (TruePositives) is then calculated by simply 
adding up the total attacks logged by the IDS. The total number of expected attacks 
(AllPositives) is calculated in the same way by adding up all expected alarms based 
on the information provided in the Baseline Results subcategory. Finally, the 
calculation of efficiency and effectiveness metric will occur. The code which carried 
out this task is as follows:  
double effectivness = total_detected_alarms / total_expected_alarms; 
effectivenessDouble.Text = effectivness.ToString(); 
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double efficiency = total_detected_alarms / all_alarms_count; 
efficiencyDouble.Text = efficiency.ToString(); 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Using Microsoft C# along with Mono, each of the three components of the framework 
has been successfully produced. A list of all programs used in this implementation 
along with their purpose is provided in Table 4.7.1.  
The aim of the project is to produce a prototype framework which is capable of 
evaluation of an NIDS. Having shown the implementation in this chapter, this aim is 
now partially met since a framework has been successfully produced. However, in 
order to fulfil the project aim completely, an evaluation of an NIDS, using this 
implemented framework must take place to show its’ capabilities. The next chapter 
provides details of this evaluation. 
Table 4.7.1 – Programs Used In Implementation 
Program Version Purpose 
Microsoft C# .NET Visual 
Studio 2008 
3.5 Primary IDE used for implementing the 
actual application. 
Monodevelop/Mono 1.0 Secondary IDE used to troubleshoot and 
run the application from a Linux 
environment. 
Nmap 4.62 Implementation of Surveillance/Probing 
Attacks. 
Hydra 5.4 Implementation of User Privilege 
Attacks. 
Hping3 3.0.0-alpha-2 Implementation of DoS and Malicious 
Software Attacks. 
Tcpreplay 3.3.1 (build 
2033) 
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5 Evaluation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the evaluation carried out on the NIDS Snort using the 
framework which has been implemented. The description for this set of experiment, 
along with test bed and configuration parameters, is provided in Section 5.2. The 
results and conclusion to the experiment is discussed in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4.  
A conclusion is provided in Section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Experiment Description  
The Attack Traffic Component of the framework is capable of carrying out 
surveillance/probing, user privilege gain, malicious software and DoS attacks. In each 
test scenario of this experiment, each and every single attack that the framework is 
capable of carrying out will be invoked against a target machine. Background traffic 
will run in conjunction with the attacks using the Background Traffic Component. 
The Monday Week 1 1998 DARPA data set (M. L. Laboratory, 1998) is used in the 
playback of background traffic.  
As stated by Peisert and Bishop (2007), an experiment which is considered 
scientifically correct will only ever contain one variation (Peisert and Bishop, 2007, p. 
142). In this case, the only variation we apply to each instance of running the 
experiment will be the playback speed of background traffic. By carrying out the 
experiment in this way, we can assess whether the volume of traffic on the network 
will have any detrimental effects to Snort’s detection abilities. Thus, a dynamic 
evaluation of the NIDS is achieved. Figure 5.2.1 below shows a schematic of how the 
experiment will take place. 
 
Figure 5.2.1 – Schematic of Experiment  
As described in the Chapter 4, the NIDS known as Snort will be used for this 
evaluation. Since Snort is a signature-based IDS, rules are required for the detection 
of attacks. The VRT certified rules from Sourcefire (2009) are used. Furthermore, 
individual rules are crafted manually to detect each attack which the application is 
capable of (see Section 5.2.2). This allows us to monitor both the detection metrics of 
efficiency and effectiveness which is part of the Evaluation Metrics Component of the 
framework. 
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A baseline of expected alarms was first established in order to allow for metric 
generation later on. The experiment was then run a total of six times. In each test, a 
variation of the playback speed of background traffic was applied whilst every other 
element remained the same. The six variations of playback speed were: 20Mbps, 
40Mbps, 60Mbps 80 Mbps, 100 Mbps and 120Mbps. A limit of 120Mbps playback 
speed was reached as it was discovered during testing that this was as fast as 
Tcpreplay was reliably capable of sending out traffic on the virtual environment (see 
Section 5.2.1 for test bed description). The play speed which were logged is as 
reported by Tcpreplay. 
In each instance of a test, Snort was first started, before background and attack traffic 
was invoked on the network using the framework. To monitor the memory usage and 
CPU utilization of the machine in which Snort resides, the top command in Linux was 
used. This command was run in batch mode, which allows the information to be 
written to a file. The –b flag tells top to run in batch mode, whilst –p is the process 
ID to monitor (which in this case should be the process ID of Snort). An example of 
this command is shown as follows: 
$ top –b –p 5118 >> resourceUtil_metrics 
After all traffic is sent through the network, Snort is stopped and retrieval of metrics 
takes place using the Evaluation Metrics component of the framework.  These results 
are logged before a new instance of the test is carried out with a different playback 
speed.  
5.2.1 Test Bed Description 
Virtual machines are used to create a private virtual network  in order to conduct the 
experiment. The software VMware (version 6.0.2) (VMWare, 2009) has been used for 
this purpose. Three virtual machines are required: one machine to run the application, 
one machine to run Snort and one machine to act as the target of attacks. All three 
machines are running the Xubuntu Distribution of Linux using kernel 2.6.27.  The 
three machines are connected to a virtual switch which is created from VMWare. The 
specifications for the three machines are presented in Table 5.2.1. Figure 5.2.2 
presents a high level diagram of the virtual network.  
 
Table 5.2.1 – Specifications of Virtual Machines 




Intel Core2 Quad 





Intel Core2 Quad 





Intel Core2 Quad 
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Figure 5.2.2 – Diagram of Virtual Network Test Bed 
As the figure above shows, the framework resides in VM 1. This virtual machine will 
generate background traffic, along with sending all attacks to VM 3, whilst VM 2 is 
configured to run Snort and monitor all network traffic seen in this virtual 
environment. VM 3, the target machine, is configured to accept both Telnet and FTP 
connections in order to realistically allow for VM 1 to generate attacks on it. After 
each test is ran with a variation in background traffic playback speed, VM 1 will 
retrieve the logs produced by Snort and parse them automatically using the Evaluation 
Metrics Component. 
In carrying out the experiments through a virtual environment, the ability to ensure no 
unexpected traffic will be seen on the network achieved. Furthermore, a greater 
control over experiments is possible since the three machines form a private virtual 
network. However, it is acknowledged that one major limitation in carrying out the 
experiments in this environment is that it may not accurately reflect a real-life 
network.  Unfortunately, due to time limitations, testing using real-life equipment in a 
laboratory setting was unable to be achieved. 
5.2.2 Snort Configuration 
Snort Version 2.7.0 (Build 35) is used for this evaluation. As described previously, 
along with the VRT rule set provided by Sourcefire, some custom rules need to be 
implemented to detect each of the attacks which the application carries out. The 
following is a comprehensive list of all custom rules which were created to detect 
each attack the application is capable of: 
 
# Raise alert if more than 3 connections are made to Telnet in 1 
second  
# seconds.  
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> any any  (msg:" Telnet Bruteforce Attack 
Detected"; flow:  from_server,established; content:"Password"; 
nocase; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, count 3, seconds 1; 
sid:001;) 
 
# Raise alert if more than 3 connections are made to FTP in 1 second 
# seconds.  
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alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 21 (msg:"FTP Bruteforce Attack 
Detected"; flow:  to_server,established; content:"PASS";  threshold: 
type threshold, track by_src, count 3, seconds 1; sid:002;) 
 
# Raise alert if packet contains ACK flag, destination port is 139  
# and contains content: “|71 61 7a 77 73 78 2e 68 73 71|” 
alert tcp any any -> any 139 (msg:"QAZ Worm Detected"; flags:A; 
content:"|71 61 7a 77 73 78 2e 68 73 71|"; sid:003;) 
 
# Raise alert if packet destination port is 80 and contains the 
# content: “X-Request-Kind-Code:” (note:|3A| is hex) 
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any 80 (msg:"Waledac Virus Detected"; 




# Raise alert if a SYN flag is sent to  port 37 
alert tcp any any -> any 37 (msg:"Sober Virus Detected"; 
flow:stateless; flags:S,12; content:".exe"; threshold:type limit, 
track by_src, count 1, seconds 60; sid:005;) 
 
# Raise alert if a UDP packet attempts connection to port 3150 with  
# content “00”. 
alert udp any any -> $HOME_NET 3150 (msg:"Deepthroat Trojan 
Detected"; flow:to_server; content:"00"; depth:2; metadata:policy 
security-ips drop; reference:mcafee,98574; reference:nessus,10053; 
classtype:trojan-activity; sid:006;) 
 
# Raise alert if more than 5 ICMP are sent in 1 second with same 
src/dst IP 
alert icmp any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Ping Flood Detected"; flow: 
stateless; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, count 5, seconds 
1; sid:007;) 
 
# Raise alert if more than 5 SYNS are sent in 1 second on port 22 
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 22 (msg:"Syn Flood Detected"; flow: 
stateless; flags:S,12; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, count 
5, seconds 1; sid:008;) 
 
# Raise alert if SYN flag attempts to connect a socket to itself 
alert tcp any any -> any 22 (msg:"LAND attack Detected"; flags:S; 
sameip; sid:009;) 
 
For the detection of surveillance/probing attacks, which are carried out using Nmap, 
Snort has an in-built pre-processor called sfportscan which will detect any attack in 
this category, thus, there is not a need to create a custom rule for this type of attack. 
The configuration for sfportscan is as follows: 
 
preprocessor sfportscan: proto  { all } \ 
                         memcap { 10000000 } \ 
                         sense_level { low }  
 
The following command was used to run Snort: 
 
snort –i eth0 –l snort_logs/ -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 2> stats.log 
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The configuration file in /etc/snort/snort.conf contains Snort’s configuration 
along with a reference to the rules to be used. The 2> command redirects the output 
of Snort once it stops running in order to save the statistics Snort reports to a file 
named stats.log. This report contains details of packet loss and all alarms logged 
which is used parsed by the evaluation metrics component. 
                scan_type { all }   
5.3 Results  
Each test run was carried out by invoking attack and background traffic as described 
in Section 5.2. After a test run finished running, the Evaluation Metrics component 
was used to automate the retrieval of logs from the IDS. These files were then 
automatically parsed by this component and the detection metrics of efficiency, 
effectiveness and packet loss were reported and made a note of. One example of the 
Evaluation Metrics Component generating these statistics is presented in Figure 5.3.1 
in which the logs retrieved were from the 120Mbps playback.  
 
Figure 5.3.1 -  Detection Metrics Generated for 120Mbps Playback 
Along with the making a note of the detection metrics, the resource utilisation metrics 
of CPU Utilisation and Memory usage are also logged. As noted in Section 5.2, the 
capabilities of the prototype framework does not allow for automated retrieval of 
resource utilisation metrics thus, these results had to be obtain by manually reading 
the file which was produced by the top command. Having acquired all data required 
for each of the six tests, the results are compiled into bar charts. 
Firstly, Figure 5.3.2 shows CPU utilization and Memory usage in comparison with the 
different playback speeds. Figure 5.3.3 then shows Efficiency and Effectiveness 
metrics in comparison with the different playback speeds whilst Figure 5.3.4 shows 
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Figure 5.3.3 – Efficiency and Effectiveness Results 
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Figure 5.3.4 – Packet Loss Metric Result 
5.4 Analysis  
This evaluation has shown that the framework is capable of generating both attack 
and background traffic. In regards to background traffic, variable playback speeds 
was achieved which meant a comparison between the resource utilisation metrics and 
detection metrics could be achieved. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the 
Evaluation Metrics component allows for quick and efficient retrieval of logs 
produced by the IDS thus results of experimentation could be easily acquired. 
The results presented in the previous section shows clearly that there is a direct 
relation between the increase in traffic and the CPU Utilisation of Snort. At around 
40% utilization and above, it appears apparent that Snort will begin to drop packets, 
as the Packet Loss figure demonstrates. Additionally, there is a relatively high 
increase in the packets loss once CPU Utilization increases to approximately 70% and 
above. However, slightly unexpected is that Snort uses the same amount of memory 
even at the highest playback speed. However, this is not considered a limitation since 
it shows Snort is quite resourceful in its use of memory even in high volumes of 
network traffic. 
In regards to detection metrics, Figure 5.3.3 shows that Snort is highly effective in the 
detection of attacks. All but one test instance reported an Effectiveness metric of 1, 
meaning all attacks were detected successfully. However, the one exception was that 
during the playback speed of 80Mbps Snort failed to log one attack. In this instance, 
Snort had reported a packet loss of 13 (Figure 5.4.1). In investigating this result, it 
was discovered that Snort had dropped an attack packet along with a few arbitrary 
background traffic packets. Thus, this highlights the absolute importance of an IDS 
having 100% effectiveness at all times. 
However, the results produced in Figure 5.3.3 in regards to the efficiency metric  does 
raise some questions. In each test run, approximately 30% of alerts raised were false-
positives. Very little variation of these results were found, and upon running a test in 
which only background traffic was generated, it was found that the VRT rule set used 
would raise false-positive alerts due to the background traffic used (which, in this 
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case, was the DARPA 1998 data set). As the purpose of this experiment was to 
conduct a black-box evaluation using the application implemented, without a greater 
degree of analysis on both the detection mechanisms used by Snort, individual 
analysis of the VRT rule set and the behaviour of traffic in the data set, it cannot be 
said for certain whether it is Snort or the data set used which is at fault at this point in 
time. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The results produced from this framework have shown that Snort is highly effective in 
the detection of attacks. It has also highlighted the fact that Snort’s greatest weakness 
may be due to packet loss. With an exceptional increase in traffic volume, Snort will 
utilize a greater degree of CPU Utilization. After reaching around 40% and above, 
packet loss occurs and, in instances such as this experiment has shown, there is the 
possibility of an attack evading Snort due to the IDS dropping the packet.  
Although it has been shown in this Chapter that the prototype framework is capable of 
providing an evaluation against the NIDS Snort, there is a certain limitation to the 
experiment carried out which must be acknowledged. The main issue which may 
provide for unreliable results is the use of a virtual network environment. Although it 
may be justified that having a virtual network environment provides for control of 
experimentation, since all three machines share the same computer system, there may 
also be underlying factors which skewer the results of the evaluation carried out by 
the framework which are not apparent. Unfortunately, although preferable, a live 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this project was to produce a framework which is capable of carrying 
out an evaluation of an NIDS. Snort was chosen as the NIDS to evaluate against. The 
results in the previous chapter have shown that this framework is capable of carrying 
out an evaluation against Snort therefore meeting the project aim.  
This chapter will discuss how the objectives of the project were met (Section 6.2) 
along with providing a critique of the prototype framework (Section 6.3). A reflection 
(Section 6.4) on overcoming some of the main difficulties, along with how the project 
was managed is discussed and, finally, some proposed future work in regards to this 
project’s topic is looked at (Section 6.5). 
 
6.2 Meeting the Objectives 
The first chapter outlined three main objectives which were:  
1. Review and research the taxonomy of IDSs and existing methodologies for 
evaluation including the testing methods applied along with metrics of 
evaluation. 
 
2. Design a framework which can be used to evaluate a NIDS based on the 
findings of the literature review with justification for design choices made. 
 
3. Implement and evaluate the framework by testing it against an NIDS to see 
what results are produced in order to assess the capabilities of the 
framework.  
An analysis on how each of the three objectives was met is provided in Section 6.2.1 
6.2.2 and 6.2.3 for objectives 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  
6.2.1 Objective 1 
The first objective was met by providing a comprehensive literature review in the area 
of IDS for this project. The taxonomy of IDSs was provided covering multiple 
subjects including detection methods, the common IDS framework and categories of 
IDSs.  Four main methodologies were also reviewed, two offline evaluation methods 
and two real-time evaluation methods. Additionally, a review was carried out on the 
types of metrics that are used in IDS evaluation.  
From the literature review, it was summarised that current existing methodologies all 
have their own strengths and weaknesses whilst there is no “correct” metric of 
measurement only metrics which would provide meaningful results. Therefore, based 
on the methodologies and evaluation metrics reviewed it was concluded that a solid 
methodology for evaluation of IDS consisted of three main requirements: 
  
1. Inclusion of Realistic Attack and Background Network Traffic 
2. Ease of Automation 
3. Inclusion of Meaningful Metrics for Evaluation 
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Based on this conclusion, a design could then be established in which attempted to 
meet all three requirements. In other words, by successfully meeting the objective of 
carrying out research and review on the subject of IDSs, this helped to create three 
focused issues which needed to be addressed in the design stage of the framework. 
6.2.2 Objective 2 
The second objective was met by specifying a design of a framework that consisted of 
three main components: attack traffic component, background traffic component and 
evaluation metrics component. Furthermore, a GUI was proposed which “wrapped” 
the three components into a single application which allowed for ease-of-use and 
automation of functions.  In specifying this design, each of the three requirements for 
a methodology in the evaluation of IDSs - which were concluded in the literature 
review - would be met.  
It was justified in the design that the use of existing programs and tools would allow 
for the most realistic live attacks possible. The design also stated the use of both 
detection metrics and resource utilisation metrics in order to provide for meaningful 
evaluation.  
The only limitation to the second objective of this project, designing a framework for 
evaluation of an NIDS, was attempting to meet the requirement of realistic 
background traffic as no tool or program is available which allowed for the generation 
of realistic background traffic. Therefore, it was proposed that Tcpreplay tool, along 
with the DARPA data set, be used instead. This design choice was justified since it 
allows for ease-of-repeatability and control of playback speed of traffic. Furthermore, 
it also means background traffic generation is not limited to specific protocols as long 
as another data set can be provided. 
6.2.3 Objective 3 
The third objective was met through implementation of the framework then using it to 
carry out an evaluation of Snort. Due to having a relatively concise design, the 
implementation stage was achieved quite smoothly. The main issue was finding a 
method to invoke the Bash shell from application, but this was resolved with the help 
of ProcessCaller code provided by Mayer (2003).  The results concluded that the 
framework was capable of carrying out high volume playback of traffic which stresses 
Snort to the point of dropping packets. This allows for the conclusion that the 
framework shows that there is a detrimental effect against CPU Utilisation and Packet 
Loss. Furthermore, it has also shown that even a loss in a very few number of packets 
may result in Snort missing an attack.   
 
6.3 Critical Analysis  
Having shown that both the aim and objectives of this project have been met, this 
section will provide a critique on the prototype framework. The strengths and 
weakness of the framework, in comparison with methodologies reviewed in the 
literature chapter is the key subject of this discussion. 
It must first be acknowledged that there are a few limitations with this framework. To 
most extents, although attack traffic and background traffic was implemented as 
specified in the design it is felt that realism of traffic playback is still lacking mainly 
due to the fact that there is no control over aggregation of attack and background 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  73 
traffic. In comparison with works including Rossey et al. (2002) and Sommers et al. 
(2006), it may be stated that these methodologies are currently more ideal since they 
allow for controlled mixtures of benign and attack traffic playback. This is a 
capability in which the framework does not currently provide. Furthermore, with no 
other option but the DARPA data set, it must be acknowledged that the background 
traffic produced may not accurately reflect real life networks.  
Another limitation in this framework is the total number of predefined attacks it is 
capable of generating. To emphasise, the work of Massicotte et al. (2006) uses the 
Metasploit Framework which allows for a huge number of different attacks and 
exploits which can be also extended through modules. Furthermore, using fragroute 
enables traffic manipulation techniques which furthers the number of attacks possible. 
The same type of techniques is used by Sommers et al. (2006) in the Trident 
evaluation.  Although the number attacks possible by MACE is only 21 (Sommers et 
al., 2006, p. 7) this is still significantly higher than what this framework is capable of. 
However, at the same time, there are strengths to this framework which are not found 
in existing methodologies. This strength is found in the Evaluation Metrics 
component which takes a relatively original approach to carry the generation of 
detection metrics. Although the metrics defined come from various sources of 
previous work, there does not appear to have been attempts in the past to simplify this 
process as has been achieved in this framework since it allows for automated retrieval 
and generation of detection metrics. 
Another strength in this framework is in the implementation of a GUI which wraps all 
existing tools into one single application. Providing a menu based system allows for 
ease of use in carrying out an evaluation especially in regards to playing back 
attack/background traffic. The GUI also provides further automation in that users may 
select predefined attacks rather than having to manually enter the commands through 
a Bash shell. The closest comparison to an existing methodology which achieves 
similar goals is the LARIAT evaluation carried out by Rossey et al. (2002). However, 
this framework differs is that the code is made open and publicly available for anyone 




Upon starting research into the subject area of IDSs, it was discovered that this topic 
was vastly more complex than initially expected. A great deal confusion was met 
when attempting to understand articles and papers written about this topic. The 
greatest obstacle in the research for this project was trying to understand the 
methodologies employed by researchers in the evaluation of IDSs since these articles 
and papers were highly technical. However, over time, the more topics that were read 
the greater the understanding that was developed which allowed for analysation of 
articles which previously had little meaning.  Overcoming of this difficulty also 
allowed for achieving the first objective in this projective, which was to provide 
research and review into the subject area of IDSs. 
Another area of difficulty faced was the design stage. There was always doubt as to 
whether the framework design was effective enough for evaluating an NIDS. This 
issue was overcome by carrying out multiple repetitions in design and testing. To 
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elaborate, a design was first established then tested. Based on the results of testing, 
refinements were made. Finally, the prototype framework which this project discusses 
was achieved.  
Making emphasis in the design allowed for ease of implementation. However, one 
issue which required to be overcome was trying to understand and get Tcpreplay work 
during the implementation stage. The main problem faced was that in the playback of 
network traffic, only some traffic would be played back (for example, the client side 
traffic only) rather than the entire data set. It was discovered over time that this was 
due to errors made in rewriting the data set and after having gained some knowledge 
on the principles of routing network traffic this issue was overcome.  
Project management is the last area of discussion in this section. It is felt that the 
project has been successfully managed from start to finish. A time plan was created in 
the form of a gantt chart at the start of this project and attempts were made to meet 
this schedule. However, it must be acknowledged that there was some deviation in 
this time plan due to other commitments but attempts were made to ensure work was 
carried out on the project if it began to fall behind schedule. Furthermore, although 
the time plan was not met completely as expected, every effort was made to have 
weekly meetings with the supervisor in regards to the project so that a focused 
workload could be maintained. The time plan is presented in Appendix 3 whilst the 
meeting diary sheets are found in Appendix 4. 
 
6.5 Future Work 
At this point, more research into the evaluation of IDSs is still essential. Although the 
framework presented in project has achieved some fundamental rquirements in testing 
of NIDSs, a great deal of work in this area of research is still both possible and, more 
importantly, necessary. 
Many improvements can be made for future work in regards to the prototype 
framework. One of the first improvements could be the inclusion of more attack 
scenarios. In the implementation, only four threat categories exist and the attacks 
which are possible are miniscule compared to real-life as the critique in Section 6.3 
has mentioned. Furthermore, the predefined attacks are hard coded into the source 
code during this implementation. Although this approach works as the attack may stay 
be edited via the command box provided, in retrospect, it is felt having separate files 
which describes each attack (eg. an XML configuration file of each attack) would 
have been  a better solution since it allows users to better customise their own attacks. 
A major extension to this framework is the possibility of providing a layered approach 
to the attack and background traffic generation components. As an example, 
Fragroute could be employed on top of existing attacks in order to manipulate packets 
to carry out evasion/insertion attacks. Also of importance would be an aggregation 
component which allows for control over the mixture of background/attack traffic 
which is generated. Although the implementation performs aggregation at the network 
interface level a greater degree of control over the mixture of attack/background 
traffic is more ideal.  An abstract example of this improved framework is presented in 
Figure 6.5.1. 
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Another area of work works which is highly important for evaluation of IDSs is an in-
depth research into the generation of background network traffic. As the literature 
review in this project has demonstrated, background traffic generation is still lacking 
in many areas including both realism and control. It would be an ideal scenario if 
some form of implementation exists which allows for the control of highly realistic 
generation of benign traffic. The work of Rossey et al. (2002) achieves this goal to 
some extent but it is not available for public use.  
To provide for an example, if an open-source implementation exists which allows a 
user to select specific traffic “profiles” which caters for all the different types of 
protocols such as 70% TCP traffic, 20% Telnet traffic and 10% SSH traffic this would 
allow an evaluation to take place on a test bed which reflects the different 
environments an IDS was employed on.  Furthermore, being open-source would allow 
it to be modified and improved to cater for any network protocol which is omitted. 
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Appendix 1 Initial Project Overview 
Title: Dynamic Performance Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) 
Overview of Project Content and Milestones 
The main evaluation focus in this project will be on signature-based IDS such as 
“Snort”. This project aims to provide an evaluation on the performance of signature-
based IDS in relation to the actual true-positive rate under various network conditions 
and activity through experimentation.   
Project milestones are as follows: 
 To research the existing technology and the main motivations behind the need 
for IDS 
 To research and understand any existing methods which are used to carry out 
dynamic evaluation of IDSs. 
 Research and design a range of experiments which will prove viable in testing 
the IDSs in terms of their performance in handling and detecting different 
types of network traffic activity and threats. 
 Implement the experiments by creating or using existing traffic playback tools 
which will make it possible to carry out such experiments on the Intrusion 
Detection System  
 Undertake research and implement the necessary methods in carrying out 
performance metric evaluation for actually evaluating how well the IDS 
performed after testing it with the implemented tools. Such performance 
metric includes: CPU utilisation, bandwidth usage and memory usage. 
 To provide an evaluation of true-positive alarms registered on an IDS based on 
various different traffic loads, for example: how many true-positives are 
registered on various types of network traffic based on high traffic load, 
medium traffic load and low traffic load.  
 Reflect on the test results based on expected results and produce overall 
conclusion. 
The Main Deliverable(s) 
An implementation of a range of experiments which will test IDSs for true-positive 
alarms in relation to variable network traffic conditions. Such tests and the evaluation 
it produces will be integrated as an automated utility. 
The results of such experiments and the implementation itself will be detailed in the 
final report. 
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The Target Audience for the Deliverable(s) 
The target audience will consist of researchers interested in the performance 
evaluation of IDS along with users who wish to either carry out their own testing on 
IDS or are interested in the results of such an evaluation. Specifically, such users will 
include people working or have interest within the security and computer networks 
field. 
The Work to be Undertaken 
This work will firstly involve the investigation into the current performance within 
IDS in general and methods which are used to test them. It will also look at any 
existing methods used to evaluate an IDS. 
Design and implement tools which will allow for the testing of IDSs under various 
network conditions. 
Such an implemented tool should also analyse the performance metric involved and 
come to a conclusion as to how effective the IDS is in detecting true-positives in 
relation to the number of intrusions actually sent. 
Additional Information / Knowledge Required 
Acquire in-depth knowledge of Ds. 
Understand performance metrics and how they are evaluated. 
Understand and successfully implement tools which will allow for the evaluation of 
IDS. 
Information Sources that Provide a Context for the Project 
Journals, articles and papers relating to the topic of IDS and computer networks in 
general will all be relevant. Some sample papers which have already been looked at 
for background reading, and prove relevant to this project are as follows: 
 Graves, J., Buchanan, W. J., Saliou, L., & Old, J. (2006). Performance 
Analysis of Network Based Forensic System for In-line and Out-of-line 
Detection and Logging. European Conference on Information Warfare and 
Security.  
 McHugh, J. (2000). Testing Intrusion Detection Systems: A Critique of the 
1998 and 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection System Evaluations as Performed 
by Lincoln Laboratory. ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security , 3 (4), 262–294. 
 Paulauskas, N., & Skudutis, J. (2008). Investigation of the Intrusion Detection 
System "Snort" Performance. Electronics and Electrical Engineering , 7 (87). 
 Sommers, J., Yegneswaran, V., & Barford, P. (2005). Toward Comprehensive 
Trafﬁc Generation. UW Technical Report , 1-12. 
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Additional sources of information Information from the various websites which relate 
the tools and software to be used for this project will also provide a good context for 
learning and understanding.  
The Importance of the Project 
In terms of computer networking, the whole purpose of an IDS is to detect any traffic 
which has been deemed dangerous or simply undesired. Such unwanted traffic should, 
in theory, always be detected by the IDS. It is considered of great importance that an 
IDS will always raise an alarm whenever unwanted network activity passes through 
the network since this is the job of the IDS. However, in practice, this is not always 
the case due to the shortcomings of the IDS. 
Thus, the importance of this project is to evaluate such IDS by designing and 
implementing tests so that we are able to come to a conclusion as to how successful 
an IDS is when it comes to detecting unwanted network traffic under various 
conditions.   
The Key Challenge(s) to be Overcome 
The main key challenge will be in deciding what the exact nature of the tool to be 
implemented for testing the IDS will be.  
Another challenge will involve deciding what types of experiments will actually be 
carried out for this project.  
Understanding and successfully implementing a method for performance metric 
generation will be another key challenge.  
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Appendix 2 Week 9 Meeting Report 
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Design Prototype of Tools used …
Creation of Basic Tools 
Test and Evaluate Tools
Refine Tools if Necessary
Implement a working prototype
Test & Evaluate Prototype
Finalise Design and Methodology
Begin Implementation Stage 1
Evaluate and Test Stage 1
Begin Implementation Stage 2
Evaluate and Test Stage 2
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    public partial class Main : Form 
    { 
        public Main() 
        { 
            InitializeComponent(); 
        } 
 
        private void Main_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
        } 
 
        private ProcessCaller processCaller; 
 
        public void runBashCommand(string arguments) 
        { 
            processCaller = new ProcessCaller(this); 
            processCaller.FileName = "bash"; 
            processCaller.Arguments = arguments; 
            processCaller.StdErrReceived += new 
DataReceivedHandler(writeStreamInfo); 
            processCaller.StdOutReceived += new 
DataReceivedHandler(writeStreamInfo); 
            processCaller.Completed += new 
EventHandler(processCompletedOrCanceled); 
            processCaller.Cancelled += new 
EventHandler(processCompletedOrCanceled); 
            this.status.Text = Environment.NewLine; 
            processCaller.Start(); 
        } 
 
        private void writeStreamInfo(object sender, 
DataReceivedEventArgs e) 
        { 
            this.status.AppendText(e.Text + Environment.NewLine); 
            if (status.TextLength >= status.MaxLength) 
status.Clear(); 
        } 
 
        private void processCompletedOrCanceled(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            this.Cursor = Cursors.Default; 
        } 
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        private void tcpprepBrowseBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".pcap .dump Files|*.pcap|All 
Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                tcpprepInputTxtBox.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
 
            else 
            { 
                MessageBox.Show("Please select a dataset"); 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void tcpprepOutputBrowseBtn_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
 
            if (OpenFolderDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
 
                String sFileName = OpenFolderDialog.SelectedPath; 
 
 
                tcpprepOutputTxtBox.Text = sFileName; 
 
            } 
 
            else 
            { 
 
                MessageBox.Show("Output Directory is required"); 
 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void createCacheBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
            string output_directory = tcpprepOutputTxtBox.Text; 
            string input_file = tcpprepInputTxtBox.Text; 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "tcpprep " + "-a bridge " + 
"-i " + input_file + " -o " + output_directory + " ' "); 
        } 
 
        private void tcpreplaydatasetBrowse_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".pcap .dump Files|*.pcap|All 
Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
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            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
 
 
                tcpreplayDatasetInputTxtBox.Text = sFileName; 
 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void status_TextChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
        } 
 
        private void tcpreplaycaheBrowse_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".cache File|*.cache|All 
Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                tcpreplayCacheInputTxtBox.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void bgtrafficBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            this.runBashCommand(" -c ' " + tcpreplayCommandBox.Text + 
" ' "); 
        } 
 
 
        private void checkBox1_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
 
            if (surprobChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                nmapGroup.Enabled = true; 
            } 
            else 
 
                if (surprobChkBox.Checked == false) 
                { 
                    nmapGroup.Enabled = false; 
                    this.nmapTarget.Text = null; 
                    this.nmapScanCommandBox.Text = null; 
                } 
 
        } 
 
        
 
 
        private void hpingChkBox_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            if (dosChkBox.Checked == true) 
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            { 
                hpingGroup.Enabled = true; 
            } 
            else 
                if (dosChkBox.Checked == false) 
                { 
                    hpingGroup.Enabled = false; 
                    this.hpingPingCommandBox.Text = ""; 
                    this.hpingTarget.Text = ""; 
                } 
        } 
 
        
        private void runAttackBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
             
            if (surprobChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                string nmap_scan = this.nmapScanCommandBox.Text; 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + nmap_scan + " ' ");                 
               
            } 
 
            if (dosChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                string hping_ping = this.hpingPingCommandBox.Text; 
                string hping_SYN = this.hpingSYNCommandBox.Text; 
                string hping_LAND = this.hpingLANDCommandBox.Text; 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hping_ping + " ' "); 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hping_SYN + " ' "); 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hping_LAND + " ' "); 
            } 
 
            if (malsoftwareChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                string qaz = this.qazCommandBox.Text; 
                string sober = this.soberCommandBox.Text; 
                string deepthroat = this.deepthroatCommandBox.Text; 
                string waledac = this.waledacCommandBox.Text; 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + qaz + " ' "); 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + sober + " ' "); 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + deepthroat + " ' "); 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + waledac + " ' ");                 
            } 
 
        
            if (usrGainChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                string hydraTelnetCommand = 
this.hydraTelnetCommandBox.Text; 
                string hydraFTPCommand = 
this.hydraFTPCommandBox.Text; 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hydraTelnetCommand + " 
' "); 
                this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + hydraFTPCommand + " ' 
"); 
            }             
        } 
 
        private void exitToolStripMenuItem_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
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        { 
 
            Application.Exit(); 
            




        private void btnRetrieveLogs_Click(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            String username = this.sshUsername.Text; 
            String target = this.sshTargetIP.Text; 
            String remotedirectoryAlarm = 
this.sshRemoteDirectoryAlarm.Text; 
            String remotedirectoryStatistics = 
this.sshRemoteDirectoryStatistics.Text; 
            String filenameAlarm = this.sshFileNameAlarm.Text; 
            String filenameStatistics = 
this.sshFileNameStatistics.Text; 
            String localdirectory = this.sshLocalDirectory.Text; 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "scp " + username + "@" + 
target + ":" + remotedirectoryAlarm + filenameAlarm + " " + 
localdirectory + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "scp " + username + "@" + 
target + ":" + remotedirectoryStatistics + filenameStatistics + " " + 
localdirectory + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "echo Log has been 
retrieved" + " ' "); 
 
        } 
 
 
        private void alarmfileBrowseBtn_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string alarmFile = this.sshFileNameAlarm.Text; 
            if (OpenFolderDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = OpenFolderDialog.SelectedPath; 
                sshLocalDirectory.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                MessageBox.Show("Output Directory is required"); 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void alarmfileBrowseBtn2_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".ids File|*.ids|All Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                alarmLog.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
        } 
 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  116 
        private void statisticslogBrowserBtn_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".log|*.log| All Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                statisticsLog.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
        } 
 
   
        private void hydraChkBox_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            if (usrGainChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                hydraGroup.Enabled = true; 
            } 
            else 
                if (usrGainChkBox.Checked == false) 
                { 
                    hydraGroup.Enabled = false; 
                    this.hydraTelnetCommandBox.Text = ""; 
                    this.hydraTarget.Text = ""; 
                    this.hydraUsername.Text = ""; 
                } 
        } 
 
        private void hydraBrowseButton_Click(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".txt |*.txt| All Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                hydraPassList.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
 
            else 
            { 
                MessageBox.Show("Please select a dataset"); 
            } 




private void effectivenessCalculateBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            findAllAlarmsDetected();            
            findPacketLoss(); 
            calculateMetrics(); 
        } 
 
        public void findAllAlarmsDetected() 
        { 
            string statisticslog = statisticsLog.Text; 
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            StreamReader streamReader = new 
StreamReader(statisticslog); 
            string fileContent = streamReader.ReadToEnd(); 
 
            Match match = Regex.Match(fileContent, @"ALERTS: (\d+)"); 
 
            if (match.Success) 
            { 
                string capture = match.Groups[1].Captures[0].Value; 
                allAlarms.Text = capture; 
            } 
        } 
 
        public void findPacketLoss() 
        { 
          
            // opens the statistics file and reads to end 
            string statisticsfile = statisticsLog.Text; 
            StreamReader streamReader = new 
StreamReader(statisticsfile); 
            string fileContent = streamReader.ReadToEnd(); 
 
            Match match = Regex.Match(fileContent, @"Dropped: 
(\d+)"); 
 
            if (match.Success) 
            { 
                string capture = match.Groups[1].Captures[0].Value; 
                packetLoss.Text = capture; 
            } 
           
            } 
         
 
       
 
        public void calculateMetrics() 
        {          
 
            string alarmfile = alarmLog.Text; 
            StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(alarmfile); //make 
sure this filepath exists 
            string text = sr.ReadToEnd(); 
            sr.Close(); 
      
            Regex r1 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Portscan" + @"\b", 
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc1 = r1.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r2 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Telnet Bruteforce Attack 
Detected" + @"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc2 = r2.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r3 = new Regex(@"\b" + "FTP Bruteforce Attack 
Detected" + @"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc3 = r3.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r4 = new Regex(@"\b" + "QAZ Worm Detected" + @"\b", 
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc4 = r4.Matches(text); 
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            Regex r5 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Waledac Virus Detected" + 
@"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc5 = r5.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r6 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Sober Virus Detected" + 
@"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc6 = r6.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r7 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Deepthroat Trojan Detected" 
+ @"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc7 = r7.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r8 = new Regex(@"\b" + "Ping Flood Detected" + 
@"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc8 = r8.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r9 = new Regex(@"\b" + "SYN Flood Detected" + 
@"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc9 = r9.Matches(text); 
 
            Regex r10 = new Regex(@"\b" + "LAND Attack Detected" + 
@"\b", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase); 
            MatchCollection mc10 = r10.Matches(text); 
  
            double nmap_alarm_count = mc1.Count; 
            double hydraTelnet_alarm_count = mc2.Count; 
            double hydraFTP_alarm_count = mc3.Count; 
            double qaz_alarm_count = mc4.Count; 
            double waledac_alarm_count = mc5.Count; 
            double sober_alarm_count = mc6.Count; 
            double deepthroat_alarm_count = mc7.Count; 
            double hpingPing_alarm_count = mc8.Count; 
            double hpingSyn_alarm_count = mc9.Count; 
            double hpingLand_alarm_count = mc10.Count; 
 
            // parse all alarms as a double 
            double all_alarms_count = 
double.Parse(this.allAlarms.Text); 
 
            // Parse baseline input numbers into double 
            int dosBaselineAlarm_int = 
int.Parse(this.dosBaselineAlarms.Text); 
            int malsoftwareBaselineAlarms_int = 
int.Parse(this.malsoftwareBaselineAlarms.Text); 
            int usrPrivBaselineAlarms_int = 
int.Parse(this.usrPrivBaselineAlarms.Text); 
            int survBaselineAlarms_int = 
int.Parse(this.survBaselineAlarms.Text); 
 
            // Count the total number of detected alarms  
            double total_detected_alarms = nmap_alarm_count + 
hydraTelnet_alarm_count + hydraFTP_alarm_count + qaz_alarm_count + 
sober_alarm_count + deepthroat_alarm_count + waledac_alarm_count + 
hpingLand_alarm_count + hpingSyn_alarm_count + hpingPing_alarm_count; 
            truePositives.Text = total_detected_alarms.ToString(); 
 
            double total_expected_alarms = survBaselineAlarms_int + 
usrPrivBaselineAlarms_int + malsoftwareBaselineAlarms_int + 
dosBaselineAlarm_int; 
            allPositives.Text = total_expected_alarms.ToString(); 
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            double effectivness = total_detected_alarms / 
total_expected_alarms; 
                                effectivenessDouble.Text = 
effectivness.ToString(); 
 
            double efficiency = total_detected_alarms / 
all_alarms_count; 
            efficiencyDouble.Text = efficiency.ToString(); 
 
 
        } 
         
 
        private void generateReportBtn_Click(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
             
             
            String truePositives = this.truePositives.Text; 
            String allAlarms = this.allAlarms.Text; 
            String allPositives = this.allAlarms.Text; 
            String packetLoss = this.packetLoss.Text; 
 
            string report = "True Positives logged by IDS: " + 
truePositives + " out of " + allAlarms + "Total Alarms Logged by IDS" 
+ allAlarms + ""; 
            System.IO.StreamWriter file = new 
System.IO.StreamWriter("c:\\Users\\newo\\Desktop\\IDS_Evaluation_Util
ity\\report.txt"); 
            file.WriteLine(report); 
 
            file.Close(); 
 
        } 
 
        private void rewrite_btn_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
            string dserverMAC = this.dserverMAC.Text; 
            string dclientMAC = this.dclientMAC.Text; 
            string sserverMAC = this.sserverMAC.Text; 
            string sclientMAC = this.sclientMAC.Text; 
            string serverIP = this.serverIP.Text; 
            string serverSubnet = this.serverSubnet.Text; 
            string clientIP = this.clientIP.Text; 
            string clientSubnet = this.clientSubnet.Text; 
            string tcprewritePCAP = this.tcprewritePCAP.Text; 
            string tcprewritePREP = this.tcprewritePREP.Text; 
            string outputdirectory = 
this.tcprewriteOutputDirectory.Text; 
 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "tcprewrite " + "--enet-
dmac=" + dserverMAC + 
                                "," + dclientMAC + " --enet-smac=" + 
sserverMAC + "," + sclientMAC + " -e " + serverIP + serverSubnet + 
":" + clientIP + clientSubnet + " -C -c " + tcprewritePREP + " -i " + 
tcprewritePCAP + " -o " + outputdirectory + " ' "); 
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        private void hydraTelnet_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string target = this.hydraTarget.Text; 
            string username = this.hydraUsername.Text; 
            string passwordList = this.hydraPassList.Text; 
 
            if (hydraTelnet.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.hydraTelnetCommandBox.Text = "hydra -l " + 
username + " -P " + passwordList + " " + target + " telnet"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.hydraTelnetCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void hydraFTP_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            string target = this.hydraTarget.Text; 
            string username = this.hydraUsername.Text; 
            string passwordList = this.hydraPassList.Text; 
            if (hydraFTP.Checked == true) 
            { 
            this.hydraFTPCommandBox.Text = "hydra -l " + username + " 
-P " + passwordList + " " + target + " ftp"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.hydraFTPCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void pingflood_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        {        
            string target = this.hpingTarget.Text; 
            if (pingflood.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.hpingPingCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -I eth0 -1 -i 
u1000 " + target + " -c 1000"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.hpingPingCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void landattack_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string target = this.hpingTarget.Text; 
            if (landattack.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.hpingLANDCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -S -a " + 
target + " -p 21 " + target; 
            } 
            else 
                this.hpingLANDCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void synflood_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            string spoof = this.hpingSpoof.Text; 
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            string target = this.hpingTarget.Text; 
            if (synflood.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.hpingSYNCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -I eth0 -a " + 
spoof + " -S " + target + " -p 22 -i u1000 -c 1000"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.hpingSYNCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void qaz_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        {             
            string target = this.malsoftwareTarget.Text; 
            if (qaz.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.qazCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -I eth0 -A " + 
target + " -p 139 -e 'qazwsx.hsq' -c 1"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.qazCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void waledac_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            string target = this.malsoftwareTarget.Text; 
            if (waledac.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.waledacCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -I eth0 " + 
target + " -p 80 -e 'X-request-kind-code:' -c 1"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.waledacCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void sober_CheckedChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string target = this.malsoftwareTarget.Text; 
            if (sober.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.soberCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -I eth0 -S " 
+target+ " -p 37 -e '.exe' -c 1"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.soberCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void malsoftwareChkBox_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            if (malsoftwareChkBox.Checked == true) 
            { 
                malsoftwareGroup.Enabled = true; 
            } 
            else 
                if (malsoftwareChkBox.Checked == false) 
                { 
                    malsoftwareGroup.Enabled = false; 
                    this.qazCommandBox.Text = ""; 
                    this.malsoftwareTarget.Text = ""; 
                } 
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        } 
 
        private void deepthroat_CheckedChanged(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string target = this.malsoftwareTarget.Text; 
            if (deepthroat.Checked == true) 
            { 
                this.deepthroatCommandBox.Text = "hping3 -I eth0 -2 
"+target+ " -p 3150 -e '00' -c 1"; 
            } 
            else 
                this.deepthroatCommandBox.Text = null; 
        } 
 
        private void updateTcpreplayboxBtn_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            string loop = this.tcpreplayLoop.Text; 
            string speed = this.tcpreplaySpeed.Text; 
            string intCA = this.intCA.Text; 
            string intUA = this.intUA.Text; 
            string cacheLocation = 
this.tcpreplayCacheInputTxtBox.Text; 
            string datasetLocation = 
this.tcpreplayDatasetInputTxtBox.Text; 
            tcpreplayCommandBox.Text = ("tcpreplay " + "-l " + loop + 
" -p " + speed + " -i " + intCA + " -I " + intUA + " -c " + 
cacheLocation + " " + datasetLocation); 
        } 
 
        private void nmapTarget_TextChanged(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            string target = this.nmapTarget.Text; 
            nmapScanCommandBox.Text = "nmap " + target; 
             
        } 
 
        private void browsetcprewritePCAP_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".pcap .dump Files|*.pcap|All 
Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                tcprewritePCAP.Text = sFileName; 
 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void browsetcprewritePREP_Click(object sender, 
EventArgs e) 
        { 
            BrowseBtnDialog.Filter = ".cache File|*.cache|All 
Files|*.*"; 
            BrowseBtnDialog.InitialDirectory = @"C:\"; 
            if (BrowseBtnDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
05002961 SOC10101 
O. Lo  - BEng (Hons) Computer Networks & Distributed Systems  123 
                String sFileName = BrowseBtnDialog.FileName; 
                tcprewritePREP.Text = sFileName; 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void tcpprepOutput_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
            if (OpenFolderDialog.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
 
                String sFileName = OpenFolderDialog.SelectedPath; 
 
 
                tcprewriteOutputDirectory.Text = sFileName; 
 
            } 
 
            else 
            { 
 
                MessageBox.Show("Output Directory is required"); 
 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void btnRetrieveLogs_Click_1(object sender, EventArgs 
e) 
        { 
            String username = this.sshUsername.Text; 
            String target = this.sshTargetIP.Text; 
            String remotedirectoryAlarm = 
this.sshRemoteDirectoryAlarm.Text; 
            String remotedirectoryStatistics = 
this.sshRemoteDirectoryStatistics.Text; 
            String filenameAlarm = this.sshFileNameAlarm.Text; 
            String filenameStatistics = 
this.sshFileNameStatistics.Text; 
            String localdirectory = this.sshLocalDirectory.Text; 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "scp " + username + "@" + 
target + ":" + remotedirectoryAlarm + filenameAlarm + " " + 
localdirectory + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "scp " + username + "@" + 
target + ":" + remotedirectoryStatistics + filenameStatistics + " " + 
localdirectory + " ' "); 
            this.runBashCommand("-c ' " + "echo Log has been 
retrieved" + " ' "); 
        } 
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Appendix 6 Class Diagram of Framework 
 
